Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity

By Olof Leimar, Peter Hammerstein. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 2001

686 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Genetics, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1030be3861ae54fac4ba3fe2b356766fdd2d3c9e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Genetics

1. Sasha R. X. Dall
2. E. Smith
3. Daniel M.T. Fessler
4. C. Hauert
5. Ernst Fehr
6. John M. McNamara
7. Brent Simpson
8. Luca Stanca

In Safety Research

1. Pat Barclay
2. Ernst Fehr
3. Urs Fischbacher
4. Robb Willer
5. P. V. van Lange
6. Daniel Balliet
7. David G. Rand
8. E. Smith

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Pat Barclay
2. Ernst Fehr
3. P. V. van Lange
4. Robb Willer
5. Urs Fischbacher
6. Daniel Balliet
7. David G. Rand
8. E. Smith

Citations in the corpus

• Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game (2005, background): “To avoid this, the concept of standing was introduced, whereby the individual remains in good standing if it refuses to help an unworthy recipient (Leimar & Hammerstein 2001).”
• The nature of human altruism (2003, background): “If, however, genetic mixing between the groups occurs, helping rates decline dramatically and approach zero 61 .”
• Strategic investment in reputation (2004, background): “Recently, theorists (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a, 1998b; Lotem et al. 1999; Leimar and Hammerstein 2001; Fishman 2003; Mohtashemi and Mui 2003) have shown that cooperation can evolve also through indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987), “give and you shall receive”.”
• Reputation, Gossip, and Human Cooperation (2016, background): “Indeed, much research demonstrates that reputation can promote cooperation, and ultimately solve the “tragedy of the commons” (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004).”
• Nobody's watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. (2005, background): “Formal models reveal that cooperation and other forms of prosocial behavior can be sustained when agents have the ability to acquire information about actors’ past actions, as this allows prosocial actors to behave in ways that reduce the opportunities for, and enhance the costs of, free-riding beha”
• Reputation management: Why and how gossip enhances generosity (2016, background): “Mathematical models demonstrate that cooperation among strangers can flourish when people condition their cooperation on partner reputation (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004).”
• Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Interaction of Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior (2008, background): “…research in the indirect reciprocity literature, which observes prosocial behavior in the absence of any obvious egoistic gains and then explains that behavior ex post as altruistic, we follow the social value orientation literature: we measure values a priori and use this measure to predict…”
• Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the ''tragedy of the commons'' (2004, background): “…games have shown that some forms of direct and indirect reciprocity can allow for the evolution of altruism, and people actually do engage in direct and indirect reciprocity (see especially Axelrod, 1984; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; but see also Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001).”
• The influence of social experience on cooperative behaviour of rats (Rattus norvegicus): direct vs generalised reciprocity (2008, background): “Theoretical models suggest that reciprocal altruism is either based on information about a particular partner’s propensity to cooperate (direct reciprocity: Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; indirect reciprocity: Nowak and Sigmund 1998, 2005; Leimar and Hammerstein 2001) or on anonymous cooperative experie”
• Envy and positional bias in the evolutionary psychology of management (2006, neutral): “Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a, b; Lotem et al., 1999, 2003; Leimer and Hammerstein, 2001 ).”
• Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts (2013, background): “However, these explanations are restricted to interactions between members of relatively small groups, where cooperators and defectors can be identified and respectively targeted by reward or punishment (Bowles & Gintis, 2011: 63–70; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003).”
• Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation (2010, background): “Although the image score version of indirect reciprocity is simpler (both analytically and in terms of the cognitive mechanisms it presumes), analysis indicates it is not evolutionarily stable (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003).”