Cooperation through image scoring in humans.

By Claus Wedekind, M. Milinski. Science, 2000

919 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ca90cad639bcd642e2c3ae279ef5904a3ddb2560

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

Reputation is valuable within and outside one’s own social group (2005, background): “…had used this information for their decision-finding always or often are included. own social group: it increases the chance of receiving help from others, i.e. cooperation by indirect reciprocity works (Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Bolton et al. 2001; Seinen and Schram 2001; Milinski et al. 2002a).”
The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “In games with repetition or reputation, these more complicated strategies explicitly condition their behavior on previous events (Dal Bó and Fré chette, 2011; Fudenberg et al., in press; Wedekind and Milinski, 1996; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000).”
The watching eyes effect in the Dictator Game: it's not how much you give, it's being seen to give something (2013, background): “…maintained by the social sanctions and reputational costs which tend to fall on those who are not sufficiently prosocial and whose behavior comes to be known to others (Barclay, 2004; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Sylwester & Roberts, 2010; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000).”
Eye Images Increase Charitable Donations: Evidence From an Opportunistic Field Experiment in a Supermarket (2012, background): “Furthermore, unlike indirect reciprocity models in which cooperation is directed towards other cooperators (Nowak & Sigmund 1998; Wedekind & Milinski 2000), reputation-based partner choice can promote unconditional prosocial acts (Sylwester & Roberts 2010).”
The personal norm of reciprocity (2003, neutral): “…economics, political science, anthropology, animal behaviour, and evolutionary psychology (see e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989; de Waal & Berger, 2000; Fehr, Gachter, & Kirchsteiger, 1997; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1998; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Trivers, 1971; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000).”
Runaway Social Selection for Displays of Partner Value and Altruism (2007, background): “Image scoring (Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Wedekind and Milinski 2000) and other reputation-based strategies such as indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1987), offer information about an individual’s reliability as a partner and can lead to mutually profitable exchanges even in the absence of repeated inter”
The influence of social experience on cooperative behaviour of rats (Rattus norvegicus): direct vs generalised reciprocity (2008, background): “Indirect reciprocity, where A helps B because B has helped C before, which is information available to A, has been demonstrated only in humans (Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Milinski et al. 2001; Semmann et al. 2005), but see Behav Ecol Sociobiol”
Measuring Indirect Reciprocity: Whose Back Do We Scratch? (2009, background): “…evidence on indirect reciprocity focuses on iterated interactions, where there can be a strategic incentive to reciprocate indirectly (e.g. Wedekind and Milinski, 2000, Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2003, Seinen and Schram, 2004, Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels, 2004, Greiner and Levati, 2005).”
Ingroup favoritism in cooperation: a meta-analysis. (2014, background): “…possibility, primary studies showed that behavior in dictator games can affect people’s reputation in groups (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) and that people give more to ingroup members in dictator games in the presence of cues of others watching (Mifune et al.,…”
The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations (2004, result): “Moreover, in contrast to other models of cooperation in groups (Robson, 1990; Nowak et al., 2000; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000), we assume Reciprocators cannot gain from being phenotypically identified as such, or by establishing a reputation for reciprocation across production periods.”