Pluralistic Ignorance in Corporate Boards and Firms' Strategic Persistence in Response to Low Firm Performance

By James D. Westphal, Michael K. Bednar. 2005

370 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Gender Studies, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eb347b3524baf5c085becf05d86953b34343dd08

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Citations in the corpus

Recategorization into the In-group (2014, background): “…and still found support for our hypothesis.5 In addition, because friendship ties among directors account for only 30 percent of their social ties (Westphal and Bednar, 2005), decategorization through self-revealing interactions is unlikely to be a major mechanism that influences new directors’…”
Need for achievement, business goals, and entrepreneurial persistence (2007, background): “In face of difficulties and bad performance, corporate leaders may persist along the old strategy due to pluralistic ignorance (Westphal and Bednar, 2005).”
Age diversity, directors' personal values, and bank performance (2016, background): “Such conflicts are likely to hinder the development of boardroom cohesiveness, produce barriers for communication, protract decision-making processes, and weaken firm performance (Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Wang and Hsu, 2013).”
Toward a Behavioral Theory of Boards and Corporate Governance (2009, neutral): “…social ties, demographic similarity, and timing of directors’ appointment affect power and politics in the upper echelon of the organization (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Zajac and Westphal, 1996a; Westphal, 1999; Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Westphal and Stern, 2006).”
Too Unsafe to Monitor? How Board–CEO Cognitive Conflict and Chair Leadership Shape Outside Director Monitoring (2020, methodology): “Consistent with Westphal and Bednar (2005), for instance, we used the Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample test alongside standard F-test statistics.”
Director Human Capital, Information Processing Demands, and Board Effectiveness (2014, neutral): “…behavior, vigilance, decision-making processes, and power (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Garg & Eisenhardt, 2013; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Westphal & Bednar, 2005; Westphal & Milton, 2000; also see Zahra & Pearce, 1989 and Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009 for extensive reviews of…”
Experience-Based Human Capital and Social Capital of Outside Directors (2009, positive): “In a similar fashion, experience on a specific board gives outside directors the opportunity to become familiar with one another’s skills, habits, and personalities, thereby enabling them to function and make decisions effectively as a group (Fischer & Pollock, 2004, Westphal & Bednar, 2005).”
Board diversity and organizational valuation: unravelling the effects of ethnicity and gender (2013, background): “A third stream of empirical studies (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Rose, 2007), indicates that board diversity has no impact on market valuation.”
Master of Puppets: How Narcissistic CEOs Construct Their Professional Worlds (2017, background): “The TMT and board members may also publicly endorse the decisions of the CEO but privately disapprove of them (Westphal & Bednar, 2005).”
Strengthening the Financial Reporting System: Can Audit Committees Deliver? (2010, neutral): “Pluralistic ignorance also reduces group members’ capabilities to voice what are perceived to be dissenting opinions because they misperceive each others’ beliefs about an issue (Westphal et al., 2005).”