Toward a Behavioral Theory of Boards and Corporate Governance

By H. Ees, Jonas Gabrielsson, M. Huse. 2009

351 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b28da46d534bfb49a672472320d2fd0a93fb023e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Giovanni Gavetti
2. D. Veltrop
3. Jakob de Haan
4. William Ocasio
5. T. Postma
6. Niels Hermes
7. Daniel A. Levinthal
8. Henrich R. Greve

In Strategy and Management

1. William Ocasio
2. Giovanni Gavetti
3. Henrich R. Greve
4. Daniel A. Levinthal
5. D. Veltrop
6. Jakob de Haan
7. T. Postma
8. Niels Hermes

Citations in the corpus

• The Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Assessment and Prospects (2012, background): “Van Ees, Gabrielsson, and Huse ( 2009 ) emphasize that while decision making in corporate governance represents a coalition of members representing diverse interests, problems of coordination, exploration, and knowledge creation may dominate over problems of conflict of interest, exploitation, and th”
• Corporate Governance, Islamic Governance and Earnings Management in Oman: A New Empirical Insights from a Behavioural Theoretical Framework (2017, neutral): “Noticeably, the rational economic (agency theory) approach has been dominant/ubiquitous because of lack of a stronger non-economic alternative (van Ees et al., 2009), and therefore recent years have witnessed increasing clarion calls for alternative theoretical perspectives to be considered (Daily…”
• The Relative Value Relevance of Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Corporate Governance Disclosure Policy Reforms in South Africa (2012, neutral): “In this paper, we contribute to extant CG disclosure literature by responding to recent calls (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009; van Ees et al., 2009) for studies that examine both shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosure practices, as well as draw on multiple theoretical perspectives, including agency,…”
• A Tale of Two Factions: Why and When Factional Demographic Faultlines Hurt Board Performance (2015, background): “There is relatively little attention for the mechanisms through which board composition affects board performance and ultimately firm performance (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008; Van Ees et al., 2009).”