Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements

By Laura Poppo, Todd R. Zenger. 2002

3,737 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c2df629438dafe8150df812f169c36f582fbad72

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In Management Information Systems

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2012, neutral): “Indeed the two are often complementary. strategy literature, many authors have drawn on related ideas to analyze long, productive relationships between firms (e.g., Dyer, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008).”
Make, Buy or Ally? Theoretical Perspectives on Knowledge Process Outsourcing Through Alliances (2010, neutral): “In this paper we identify, illustrate, and explain critical transaction and governance issues involved in KPO, including the coordination and monitoring of knowledge transfer through both contractual and relational governance (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2006; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).”
From the Vendor's Perspective: Exploring the Value Proposition in Information Technology Outsourcing (2003, background): “From this literature, we learn that informal (interpersonal trust) and formal (contractual) aspects of the relationship are equally important (Poppo 2002; Sabherwal 1999) and need to be developed (Kern and Willcocks 2001; Willcocks and Kern 1998; Willcocks and Lacity 2000).”
The Role of Service Level Agreements in Relational Management of Information Technology Outsourcing: An Empirical Study (2009, methodology): “Following Poppo and Zenger (2002), this study intends to examine the existence of a dynamic complementary relationship between a formal contract and relational governance.”
Modes of Cooperative R&D Commercialization by Start-ups (2009, neutral): “Poppo and Zenger (2002) addressed the debate pitting formal contracting versus relational governance, finding that the two approaches can be reinforcing complements rather than dividing substitutes.”
Power Asymmetry, Adaptation and Collaboration in Dyadic Relationships Involving a Powerful Partner (2013, neutral): “First, the study corroborates the argument that formal incentive systems complement relational exchange mechanisms (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Kaufmann & Carter, 2006).”
Alliance Capabilities (2015, background): “The study assumed that two firms’ relational capabilities are additive and therefore operationalized the dyad-level capability as the sum of firm-level capabilities.”
Performance Implications of Mismatched Governance Regimes across External and Internal Relationships (2011, methodology): “Such scenarios have received some attention in prior research (e.g., Poppo and Zenger 2002; Zenger, Lazzarini, and Poppo 2002) based on the notion that explicit incentives may degrade the coordination benefits of social norms (e.g., Bowles 2008; Frey and Stutzer 2007; Kreps 1997).”
Strategic alliance contracts: dimensions and determinants of contractual complexity (2007, background): “…Given the recent debate and evidence on whether relational governance and formal governance are substitutes or complements (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), future research that examines whether relational governance mechanisms substitute or complement distinct types of…”