WHEN THE KNOWN DEVIL IS BETTER THAN AN UNKNOWN GOD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF RELAY CEO SUCCESSIONS

By Y. Zhang, N. Rajagopalan. 2004

394 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bbe62458196f7b9ffd6c80e49cde0082c35877a1

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In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

When does transitioning from family to professional management improve firm performance (2015, background): “We also find that professional managers do not perform to potential when outgoing family CEOs stay in firms in a capacity to supervise them, which contrasts with the higher performance of “relay CEO succession” among professional managers (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004).”
Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital (2013, background): “Shareholders value effective succession planning that leads to smooth CEO succession (Shen and Cannella (2003); Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004)).”
How do managerial successions shape corporate financial policies in family firms (2011, background): “As such, the selection of a new CEO represents one of the most critical decisions for a firm's future direction and effectiveness (Shen and Cannella, 2002, 2003; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004, 2010).”
CEO Succession Mechanisms, Organizational Context, and Performance: A Socio‐Emotional Wealth Perspective on Family‐Controlled Firms (2014, methodology): “This measure has also been used in studies testing the ‘family effect’ on firm performance (see Dyer, 2006), and in CEO succession research (e.g., Bennedsen et al., 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008; Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998; Perez-Gonzales, 2006; Shen and Cannella, 2002; Zhang and Rajagopalan, ”
Within or Without? How Firms Combine Internal and External Labor Markets to Fill Jobs (2014, background): “Studies based on CEO labor markets also suggest that firms may have a greater preference for external hiring when performance has been poor (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004).”
CEO Succession Origin and Firm Performance: A Multilevel Study (2017, neutral): “Scholars have argued that under conditions of poor firm performance “other executives may contest the new CEO’s power if he or she has not yet” become familiarized with the firm’s internal context (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004, p. 488).”
Toward a Configurational Perspective on the CEO (2016, background): “Whether an internal or external candidate is selected, there are a number of variables, involving both external forces and intrafirm dynamics, including internal “tournaments,” that influence who receives the job (Y. Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004).”
Once an outsider, always an outsider? CEO origin, strategic change, and firm performance (2010, background): “Cannella, 2002; Wiersema, 1995; Zajac, 1990; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004; Zhang, 2008).”