How do managerial successions shape corporate financial policies in family firms

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Financial Decision Making in Family Firms (2014, background): “Indeed, there is an increasing body of work on family firm financing (e.g., Amore et al., 2011; Andres, 2008; Bagnoli, Liu, & Watts, 2011; Croci, Doukas, & Gonenc, 2011; Koropp et al., 2013; Steijvers & Voordeckers, 2009), which has produced a rather diverse picture of family firm financing.”
Financing Decisions in Family Businesses: A Review and Suggestions for Developing the Field (2017, background): “Finally, Koropp, Grichnik, and Gygax (2013) and Amore et al. (2011) investigate the impact of succession on the firm’s financing policies, where the latter study, for example, finds that nonfamily CEOs stimulate the use of leverage.”
Owner‐Management, Firm Age, and Productivity in Italian Family Firms (2014, background): “Amore et al. (2011), focusing on the question of succession, found that the appointment of non-family professional CEOs leads to a significant increase in the use of debt to sustain investment needs without incurring any dilution of control associated to equity issuances.”
CEO Succession Mechanisms, Organizational Context, and Performance: A Socio‐Emotional Wealth Perspective on Family‐Controlled Firms (2014, methodology): “These represent widely used sources of information for private firms in Italy (see, e.g., Amore et al., 2011, 2014; Miller et al., 2013).”