Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from “Mergers of Equals”

By Julie Wulf. 2004

161 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/30e9fb2f2153af63390ac212a31ca239150ebc43

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Citations in the corpus

Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers (2012, background): “For instance, it has been shown that larger managerial ownership increases premiums (Stulz, 1988; Stulz, Walkling, and Song, 1990; Song and Walkling, 1993; Moeller, 2005) and that managers trade premiums for private benefits (Wulf, 2004; Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004).”
Board of Directors' Size and Performance in the Banking Industry (2009, background): “Second, banking M&As are in most of the cases friendly, which implies that some of the directors, either officers or outsiders, of the target bank join the board of the surviving bank (see, for example, Wulf, 2004”
The Pre-Deal Phase of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda (2020, background): “Furthermore, it has been suggested that target CEOs may be biased to accept a lower premium in exchange for a future position in the merged firm (Hartzell, Ofek, & Yermack, 2004; Wulf, 2004) or special deal-related bonuses (J. Cai & Vijh, 2007; Fich, Rice, & Tran, 2016; Hartzell et al., 2004).”
Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership (2008, background): “…including acquirers’ past M&A experience (e.g., Bruton, Oviatt, and White, 1994), diversification (e.g., Chatterjee, 1986), deal structure (e.g., Wulf, 2004), method of payment (e.g., Travlos, 1987), leveraging of firm knowledge, innovation, or resource base (e.g., Morrow et al., 2007;…”
How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important? (2009, unknown): “Wulf (2004) finds that the premiums paid to target shareholders for MOE transactions are also affected by the target CEO’s trade-off 12 Hasan (1992) finds a significant positive relationship between Beta and credit losses for the sample of 32 publicly traded U.S. banks. between power and purchase…”
CEO Preferences and Acquisitions (2014, unknown): “…the London School of Economics, Indiana University, Michigan State University, the University of Chicago, and conference participants at the 2011 Econometric Society Meeting, the 2011 Western Finance Association Meeting, the 2011 Duke-UNC Corporate Finance Conference, and the 2011 SFS Cavalcade.”
Caveat Venditor: Trust Asymmetries in Acquisitions of Entrepreneurial Firms (2009, background): “The buyer typically dominates key managerial positions as well as the board of directors of the combined firm (Harford, 2003; Hartzell, Ofek, & Yermack, 2004; Wulf, 2004).”
Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs (2007, background): “…supported by Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004), who find that target CEOs accept a lower acquisition premium when they derive personal gains in the form of side payments, and Wulf (2004), who finds that they accept a lower acquisition premium when they negotiate shared control in the merged firm.”
Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control (2008, unknown): “For example, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) and Wulf (2004) find that target managers often receive additional benefits, negotiated directly with acquirers, in completed change-in-control transactions, the most prevalent being post-acquisition employment with an acquirer.”
Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors׳ portfolio weights (2015, unknown): “…premiums are inversely related to the size of the target firm (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2008), to the relative size of the parties (Cai and Sevilir, 2012), and also decline when the transaction is characterized as a merger of equals (Wulf, 2004, and Wang and Xie, 2009).”