Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs

By Jie Cai, Anand M. Vijh. 2007

148 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ad64c9064901f9b717bfe1d278adc2d891e1a39c

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Citations in the corpus

Bond market access and investment (2014, background): “For example, the coefficient estimates for Sales are positive and significant, indicating that large firms are more likely to be acquirers (Cai and Vijh, 2007).”
Earnings Management, Lawsuits, and Stock-for-Stock Acquirers' Market Performance (2008, background): “Cai and Vijh (2007) also suggest that target CEOs who face high illiquidity discounts tend to leave after the acquisitions are completed.”
CEO Preferences and Acquisitions (2014, unknown): “Cai and Vijh (2007) find evidence that CEOs with illiquid holdings are more likely to receive takeover bids and less likely to resist bids.”
The Pre-Deal Phase of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda (2020, background): “Furthermore, it has been suggested that target CEOs may be biased to accept a lower premium in exchange for a future position in the merged firm (Hartzell, Ofek, & Yermack, 2004; Wulf, 2004) or special deal-related bonuses (J. Cai & Vijh, 2007; Fich, Rice, & Tran, 2016; Hartzell et al., 2004).”
Playing It Safe? Managerial Preferences, Risk, and Agency Conflicts (2016, background): “First, prior evidence suggests that managers use diversifying acquisitions as a way to reduce their firms’ risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981; May, 1995; Cai and Vijh, 2007; Acharya, Amihud, and Litov, 2011; Gormley and Matsa, 2011).”
The Role of Risk Management in Mergers and Merger Waves (2011, unknown): “Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), and Cai and Vijh (2007) all suggest that waves are at least associated with, if not driven by, high valuations of bidder stock.”
Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value? (2010, unknown): “We use the procedure of Cai and Vijh (2007) to infer the terms of the option holdings of a CEO.”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Equity incentives have been associated with better operating performance (Core and Larcker, 2002), more and better acquisitions (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Cai and Vijh, 2007), larger restructurings and layo¤s (Dial and Murphy, 1995; Brookman, Chang, and Rennie, 2007), and more voluntar”