Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors׳ portfolio weights

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Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “The blockholder’s monitoring probability depends on her dollar block size relative to her dollar portfolio, as used in Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015).”
Institutional Cross-Ownership and Corporate Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions (2018, unknown): “According to the regression results, if an acquirer switches from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000 before the deal announcement, there is a significant decline in institutional cross-owner numbers.18 18This result is consistent with Fich et al. (2015).”
Governance and Taxes: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity (2016, unknown): “GIndexi,t is the five-year rolling average of the Gompers et al. [2003] governance index, which takes values between 0 and 24.”
Investor horizons, long-term blockholders, and corporate social responsibility (2019, background): “Theory predicts that blockholders put more effort into monitoring when their ownership stake in the firm is larger (Shleifer and Vishny 1986) and when they hold a concentrated portfolio of large ownership positions (Fich, Harford, and Tran 2015).”