Claudio Mezzetti
2001–2004
A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 7 researchers and is trusted by 1 researcher here, as inferred from the citation graph.
Whom Claudio Mezzetti trusts overall
Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.
Who trusts Claudio Mezzetti overall
Papers from Claudio Mezzetti's perspective
Ordered by how strongly the researchers Claudio Mezzetti trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.
- Optimal Auction Design
- AN EFFICIENT AUCTION
- The Role of Leasing under Adverse Selection (Journal of Political Economy)
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- The evolution of cooperation
- Job Market Signaling
- An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
- EFFICIENCY OF LARGE DOUBLE AUCTIONS
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- The Measurement of Intellectual Influence
Their papers
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency (2004) — 173 citations
- Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial (2001) — 125 citations