EFFICIENCY OF LARGE DOUBLE AUCTIONS

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Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium (2006, background): “The most general result along these lines is due to Cripps and Swinkels (2006) who not only permit an exceptionally large class of value distributions, but also permit agents to employ mixed as well as pure strategies, relying on Jackson and Swinkels (2005) for equilibrium existence.”
Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions (2006, background): “Using an entirely different approach, Jackson and Swinkels (2005) (hereafter ‘JS’) establish existence of equilibrium in distributional strategies in a wide variety of auctions when bidders have multi-dimensional correlated private values.”
The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2010, unknown): “E�f i ;�g j[(a f i � f i )(a g j � g j)] ( 23 )”
Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information (2008, background): “well). This is also the rate of convergence to efficiency obtained in a double auction context by Cripps and Swinkels (2006) .”