Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial
By Scott R. Baker, Claudio Mezzetti. 2001
125 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Law
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e6318b7a427b4d6a5b7ef2483c2d2bda477d2d18
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Law
Citations in the corpus
- Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases (2015, background): “Prosecutors have a variety of incentives to balance, including career incentives that push toward maximizing sentences and resource constraints that discourage going to trial (see, for example, Baker and Mezzetti 2001; Easterbrook 1983).”