AN EFFICIENT AUCTION

By Motty Perry, Philip J. Reny. 2002

146 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ad172b8ef50c13dc75bbd1b4a3b36496fe2a7c5e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Information Systems

1. Claudio Mezzetti
2. Benny Moldovanu
3. Dirk Bergemann
4. Lawrence M. Ausubel
5. Peter Cramton

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Dirk Bergemann
2. Claudio Mezzetti
3. Philippe Jehiel
4. Stephen Morris
5. Benny Moldovanu
6. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
7. William R. Zame
8. Lawrence M. Ausubel

In Marketing

1. Claudio Mezzetti
2. Dirk Bergemann
3. Philippe Jehiel
4. Stephen Morris
5. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
6. William R. Zame
7. Benny Moldovanu
8. Lawrence M. Ausubel

Citations in the corpus

• The Limits of ex post Implementation (2006, background): “…shown that e¢ cient ex-post implementation is possible when signals are one-dimensional and satisfy a single-crossing property (see Cremer and McLean, 1985; Maskin, 1992; Ausubel, 1997; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001; Bergemann and Välimäki, 2002; and Perry and Reny, 2002).”
• An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities (2006, background): “…mechanisms for private values settings, as well as recent papers examining the possibility or impossibility of efficient mechanisms with interdependent values, including Maskin (1992), Ausubel (1999), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Perry and Reny (2002).”
• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms (2009, background): “…large and important literature on one-dimensional interdependent type models, including papers on auction environments (Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Perry and Reny (2002), Bergemann and Välimäki (2002)), the bilateral trading model (Gresik (1991) and Fieseler, Kittsteiner, and Moldovanu (2003)),…”
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency (2004, methodology): “1617 CLAUDIO MEZZETTI and Valimaki (2002), and Perry and Reny (2002)).”