The evolution of cooperation

By R. May. 1981

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Citations in the corpus

Challenges for Transparency (2017, background): “In subsequent work, Hammond and Axelrod (2006) expanded the framework to consider agents which have an extra feature of ‘ethnicity’ which might be regarded as their color or tribe.”
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas (2017, background): “, direct reciprocity [4, 5, 6, 7], indirect reciprocity [8], norm enforcement [9, 10], simple reinforcement learning variants [3], multiagent reinforcement learning [11, 12, 13, 14, 15], spatial structure [16], emotions [17], and social network effects [18, 19].”
A survey and critique of multiagent deep reinforcement learning (2018, background): “mic) actions, but they are temporally extended (over policies).In the related setting of one shot Markov social dilemmas, Lerer and Peysakhovich [173] extended the famous Tit-for-Tat (TFT)20 strategy [184] for DRL (using function approximators) and showed (theoretically and experimentally) that such”
A Resource-Based Theory of Strategic Alliances (2000, background): “We discuss how the resource profiles of partner firms would determine their structural preferences in terms of four major categories of alliances: equity joint ventures, minority equity alliances, bilateral contract-based alliances, and unilateral contractbased alliances.”
Overcoming Inaction through Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship: Insights from Regime Theory (2007, background): “Since regimes do not exist in a societal vacuum, the repercussions of agreement violation may extend beyond the focal issue (Axelrod 1984), as in the attempts by OPEC members to link oil discussions with political issues.”
Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, background): “In this case, cooperation can be sustained through reciprocal strategies [5,128,129]: if I know that you will only cooperate with me next round if I cooperate with you now, then cooperation can be self-interested — provided that the probability that we play again for another round (i.”
Repairing and Enhancing Trust: Approaches to Reducing Organizational Trust Deficits (2010, background): “Axelrod (1984) discovered that tit-for-tat strategies were most successful in restoring cooperation between competing, distrusting adversaries.”
The Evolution of Contingent Cooperation (2006, background): “The most popular form of reciprocal altruism is the tit-for-tat strategy, in which an act of cooperation by ego with individual Y at time t is based on Y’s cooperation with ego at time (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981).”