Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

By Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki. 2002

333 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ae04d0f4a1d461ef298d088dffa953d5e10e0a3b

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Citations in the corpus

Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency (2004, background): “However, Bergemann and Valimaki (2002) showed that no such mechanism provides agents with the incentives for efficient ex-ante information acquisition (see also Maskin (1992)).”
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions (2006, background): “See Milgrom [30] and subsequent papers on information acquisition in auction, which include Bergemann and Välimäki [6], Matthews [27], Persico [35], and Tan [40].”
The Limits of ex post Implementation (2006, background): “6 There is a residual set G1 ⊂ H1 and a residual and finitely prevalent subset Gk+1 ⊂ Hk+1 such that if (μ(1), μ(2)) ∈ G1 or (μ(1), μ(2)) ∈ Gk+1 then (1) there do not exist b s ∈ intS and y ∈ Rd1 such that ∇s1μ(2)(s) − y and ∇s1μ(1)(s) are co-directional for every s ∈ Ĩ1(b s) (2) there do not exist ”
Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats? (2007, background): “Assume now that in equilibrium, an uninformed bidder, say bidder i, bids p < p∗ in stage 1; let σ(p(3)) denote his continuation strategy, as a function of p(3), and denote by b v(p(3)) the corresponding (continuation) equilibrium payoff.”
Information structures in optimal auctions (2007, background): “Finally, Bergemann & Valimaki (forthcoming) consider information acquisition in a general efficient mechanism design setting.”
Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms (2009, background): “…on one-dimensional interdependent type models, including papers on auction environments (Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Perry and Reny (2002), Bergemann and Välimäki (2002)), the bilateral trading model (Gresik (1991) and Fieseler, Kittsteiner, and Moldovanu (2003)), and public and team…”
Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (2011, neutral): “Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) and Bergemann and Morris (2005), among others, show that the e¢ cient social allocation can be implemented in an ex-post equilibrium and hence in Bayes Nash equilibrium for all type spaces, with our without a common prior.1 But in given…”