Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions

By Jeroen M. Swinkels. 2001

137 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/54d67affcd0e272ed19c53003fac413252ff1cc9

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Citations in the corpus

Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply (2001, background): “(2)However, Swinkels (2001) shows that if there is sufficient noise in the auction so that the equilibria satisfy a condition he calls Asymptotic Environmental Similarity, then bids converge to marginal values in uniform-price private-value auctions as the number of bidders goes to infinity.”
Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium (2006, methodology): “This differs from the rationing rule described in Wilson (1985) and Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994), where only the long side of the market is rationed equiprobably.”
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “More broadly, in the mechanism design literature, there is a long tradition of studying the properties of large markets (Hurwicz 1972; Roberts and Postlewaite 1976; Jackson and Manelli 1997; Reny and Perry 2006; Pesendorfer and Swinkels 2000; Swinkels 2001; Bodoh-Creed 2010).”
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014, unknown): “Other theoretical advances focused on the revenue rankings and efficiency in large, competitive markets (Swinkels, 2001; Federico and Rahman, 2003; Jackson and Kremer, 2006), abstracting from the strategic effects of bidders' market power (Federico and Rahman (2003) also analyse monopolistic market…”
EFFICIENCY OF LARGE DOUBLE AUCTIONS (2003, methodology): “This paper thus significantly generalizes Swinkels (2001) for the uniform price case.”
An Exploratory Study of the Introduction of Online Reverse Auctions (2003, background): “I consider how these variables may differ across auction (open bid and sealed bid) and supplier (new or current) type.”
Online reverse auctions: Issues, themes, and prospects for the future (2002, background): “The survey data are supportive of this notion; specifically, a correlational analysis indicates that as the number of lots in an auction event increased, buyers are less satisfied (r= -.33, p<.10) with the auction tool and tend to evaluate it more negatively (r= -.39, p<.05).”