Job Market Signaling
By M. Spence. 1973
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Mike W. Peng
- Igor Filatotchev
- Mike Wright
- Tom Vanacker
- Garry D. Bruton
- Shaker A. Zahra
- Yoshua Bengio
- David B. Audretsch
Citations in the corpus
- Price of Transparency in Strategic Machine Learning (2016, background): “There exists a substantial amount of literature in information economics on communicating information in senser-receiver games: using as advertising [12], [13], education [14], disclosure of verifiable information [15], or cheap talk [16], or information disclosure[17], [18].”
- A Short-term Intervention for Long-term Fairness in the Labor Market (2017, background): “Unlike in Spence’s original work on education signaling [20] in which investment confers no productivity benets and thus operates purely as a signal to employers, in our model, a a worker’s chosen investment level η has intrinsic value insofar as it is positively correlated with her likelihood of b”
- Do Ethical Leaders Get Ahead? Exploring Ethical Leadership and Promotability (2010, background): “High pressure contexts then may serve to amplify the signals sent to superiors about a leader's commitment to ethical leadership (Spence, 1973) in the face of strong competing behavioral choices.”
- Evaluating Students' Evaluations of Professors (2014, unknown): “Second, if the students who dislike exerting effort are least able, as it is assumed for example in the signaling del of schooling (Spence, 1973), we expect the relation between our measures of teacher effectiveness the average students’ evaluations to be less negative in ses where the share of high”
- Entrepreneurial Signaling via Education: A Success Factor in Innovative Start-Ups (2007, methodology): “In other words, founders of innovative start-upswhofind a way to overcome the initial problem of asymmetric information in the relevant markets are likely to run their new venture more successfully (see e.g. Hunsdiek/May-Strobl, 1986; Binks/ Ennew, 1996; Egeln et al., 1997; Falk, 1999) The objective”
- Learning and Earning: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in India (2017, background): “Second, it is plausible that women take-up the training program not to acquire skills but rather to acquire the certificate they would receive at the completion of the program to signal their ability in the labor market (Spence, 1973).”
- Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector (2004, unknown): “Our model is related to the literature on screening of workers’ ability following the seminal papers by Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (for an overview, see Riley, 2001).”
- Establishing a Diversity Program is Not Enough: Exploring the Determinants of Diversity Climate (2010, background): “Also consistent with this reasoning, signaling theory suggests that employees rely on organizational cues and signals in the interpretation of an organization’s commitment and goals (Spence 1973).”
- How does product program innovativeness affect customer satisfaction? A comparison of goods and services (2011, background): “Second, information economics predicts that customers assess their exchange relationship with a company on the basis of the allocation of information between the two parties ( Spence 1973 ).”
- Toward a “theoretical toolbox” for sustainability research in marketing (2011, background): “In his seminal formulation, Spence (1974) found that job applicants in the labor market attempt to reduce information asymmetry by signaling their underlying quality with education credentials.”
- EMPLOYEES' CHALLENGING JOB EXPERIENCES AND SUPERVISORS' EVALUATIONS OF PROMOTABILITY (2009, methodology): “Spence (1973) suggested that supervisors therefore would rely on signals that reflect employees’ capacities and talents when they evaluate their employees’ promotability.”
- Creating Strategic Business Value from Big Data Analytics: A Research Framework (2018, background): “Signaling theory indicates that a signal or communication of private information by an agent reduces information asymmetry between the agent and the principal [51].”