Dirk Engelmann

Safety Research · 2000–2011

A researcher in the Science corpus: 5 papers; trusts 22 researchers and is trusted by 33 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Safety Research — 55 citations into it; #408 of 5,829 by trust here, #238 by citations
• General Decision Sciences — 31 citations into it; #202 of 1,995 by trust here, #116 by citations
• Economics and Econometrics — 30 citations into it; #4,590 of 23,481 by trust here, #3,801 by citations
• Demography — 20 citations into it; #4,068 of 4,236 by trust here, #3,641 by citations
• Sociology and Political Science — 16 citations into it; #21,836 of 22,756 by trust here, #20,051 by citations

Whom Dirk Engelmann trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Joachim I. Krueger
2. L. Ross
3. Ernst Fehr
4. Gary E. Bolton
5. Jacob K. Goeree
6. Gary Charness
7. Russell W. Clement
8. John H. Kagel
9. Matthew Rabin
10. Kenneth Clark

Who trusts Dirk Engelmann overall

1. Ernst Fehr
2. Fredrik Carlsson
3. Hans-Theo Normann
4. Matthias Sutter
5. Alexander W. Cappelen
6. Olof Johansson-Stenman
7. Mariana Blanco
8. Simon Gächter
9. David J. Cooper
10. Michal Krawczyk

Papers from Dirk Engelmann's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Dirk Engelmann trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
2. A theory of reciprocity (Games Econ. Behav.)
3. NOTES AND COMMENTS GIVING ACCORDING TO GARP: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE CONSISTENCY OF PREFERENCES FOR ALTRUISM
4. Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game
5. A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness (Games Econ. Behav.)
6. The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation
7. On the Nature of Fair Behavior
8. The truly false consensus effect: an ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception.
9. Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects
10. Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets

Their papers

• Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments (2002) — 1,297 citations
• The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given (2000) — 122 citations
• Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds (2011) — 113 citations
• A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2011) — 671 citations
• Appendix for: Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is There a Hedging Problem? (2010) — 298 citations