Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets
By Steffen Huck, Wieland Müller, Hans-Theo Normann. 2001
177 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0ef45c6d9cebb85f6b19ff618b98c9a33a31f3cc
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Ernst Fehr
- James C. Cox
- Hans-Theo Normann
- Matthias Sutter
- Cary A. Deck
- Samuel Bowles
- Martin G. Kocher
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Hans-Theo Normann
- James C. Cox
- Daniel Friedman
- Steven Gjerstad
- Dirk Engelmann
- Mariana Blanco
Citations in the corpus
- A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2011, result): “10F&S (p. 824) acknowledge that subjects with βi < 0 may exist and indeed behavior consistent with the existence of such preferences has been observed in the Stackelberg experiments of Huck et al. (2001).”
- Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories (2006, methodology): “…than this reference payoff, r(x) (and λ ) are negative and player i wants to hurt player j.17 Cox et al. estimate the parameters of their model separately using the existing experimental data for the mini-ultimatum game (Falk et al., 2003) and for a Stackelberg duopoly game (Huck et al, 2001).”
- The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories. (2005, methodology): “…than this reference payoff, r(x) (and λ ) are negative and player i wants to hurt player j.17 Cox et al. estimate the parameters of their model separately using the existing experimental data for the mini-ultimatum game (Falk et al., 2003) and for a Stackelberg duopoly game (Huck et al, 2001).”
- Simultaneous and Sequential Contributions to Step-level Public Goods (2015, unknown): “First movers behave ‘‘too greedily,’’ as has been observed in previous experiments (e.g., Huck, Muller, and Normann 2001).”
- A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness (2007, background): “Huck, Müller, and Normann (2001) present an experiment in which randomly matched pairs of subjects play a Stackelberg duopoly game.”