The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation

By Kenneth Clark, Martin Sefton. 2001

289 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b7fa17f3a201d9281738de5592d129ee597e7c8d

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Citations in the corpus

A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2011, methodology): “The sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma (henceforth SPD) (Clark and Sefton, 2001) is a prisoner’s dilemma where one player moves first, the other player second.”
Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study (2007, background): “Since leaders contribute 27% of the time when m = 0.75, and followers mimic the leader’s contribution one-third of the game when m = 0.8, Clark and Sefton (2001) find that followers are more likely to contribute when the leader contributes (37”
The neural correlates of theory of mind within interpersonal interactions (2004, background): “This approximates the 42% rate of reciprocation to cooperation observed in second movers in a sequential PDG (Clark and Sefton, 2001).”
The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods (2006, background): “(2000); Clark and Sefton (2001); Schmidt et al. (2001); Coats and Neilson (2005); and Seely, Van Huyck, and Battalio (2005).”
Promises and Lies: Restoring Violated Trust (2006, background): “…are members of the same social network (Bowles & Gintis, 2004), such as from the same neighborhood; when participants have the ability to punish a free-riding counterpart (Fehr & Gachter, 2000); and when participants initiate an interaction by cooperating with each other (Clark & Sefton, 2001).”
Cooperation Among Strangers with Limited Information About Reputation (2005, background): “Symmetric games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, involve direct reciprocal behaviors based on expectations of what the partner will do at the current stage (e.g., Croson, 2000; Clark and Sefton, 2001; Güth et al., 2003).”
Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation (2002, unknown): “, Croson (1996), and Keser and van Winden (2000) for public goods games and Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Cooper et al. (1996) for simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma games. 9 It should be noted though that efficient trading between two parties might be detrimental for third parties. In the labour mark”
Do Labour Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Some Experimental Evidence (2004, background): “Ninety-two percent of all senders sent a positive amount of money, and 80% of all responders who were sent money returned a positive amount.2 Another related sequential prisoner’s dilemma study is Clark and Sefton (2001).”
Why are Economists so Different? Nature, Nurture and Gender Effects in a Simple Trust Game (2014, unknown): “, Clark and Sefton, 2001). Surprisingly enough, there has been, to the best of our knowledge, hardly any literature which combines these two strands of research even though some questions appear to be obvious such as: Are female economists predominantly female or predominantly economists or, put dif”