The truly false consensus effect: an ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception.

By Joachim I. Krueger, Russell W. Clement. 1994

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Citations in the corpus

Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem (2013, neutral): “When specific information about a person’s reputation or traits is unavailable, we may predict others’ preferences by assuming that they will share our own preferences (Krueger and Clement, 1994; Ross et al., 1977).”
Perspective taking in children and adults: Equivalent egocentrism but differential correction (2004, background): “Adults, for example, tend to overestimate the extent to which others share their own attitudes and feelings ( Krueger & Clement, 1994; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), believe others have more access to their internal states than others actually do (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998), use their own k”
Why do people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review. (2004, background): “Although women in the no stereotype threat condition were more likely to emphasize their similarity to other women on a social projection measure (Krueger & Clement, 1994) after being reminded of their mortality, activating stereotype threat by having them anticipate taking a challenging math test…”
Who's with Me? False Consensus, Brokerage, and Ethical Decision Making in Organizations (2010, background): “The presence of the false consensus effect or even the truly false consensus effect (Dawes, 1989; Krueger & Clement, 1994) does not necessarily indicate that an individual believes he or she is in the majority.”
Cultural Intelligence in Organizations (2006, background): “This effect is extremely difficult to control (Krueger & Clement, 1994).”
Toward a Behavioral Theory of Strategy (2012, background): “represented in terms proper to that category (Krueger and Clement, 1994).”
A Social Comparison Theory Meta-Analysis 60+ Years On (2017, background): “This criterion was established to exclude studies about the better-than-averageeffect, which is a social projective bias (Alicke, 1985; Krueger & Clement, 1994), and to more accurately gauge the impact of single comparisons.”
Social Projection to Ingroups and Outgroups: A Review and Meta-Analysis (2005, unknown): “, in real groups ) suggests that people still failed to weight other - referent information optimally ( Alicke & Largo , 1995 ; Clement & Krueger , 2000 ; Krueger & Clement , 1994 ) .”
Neural correlates of anchoring-and-adjustment during mentalizing (2010, background): “) In contrast, the pattern of activity in the ventral cluster was best described by a thresholdlike response, whereby trials with zero discrepancy between self and other were significantly different from trials with any amount of discrepancy (1, 2, or 3+)—F(1, 62) = 11.”
From social projection to social behaviour (2007, background): “One debiasing study showed that simple forewarnings have no effect (Krueger & Clement, 1994), although recent evidence shows that incentives for accuracy reduce egocentrism (Epley et al., 2004).”
Social Identity Complexity: Its Correlates and Antecedents (2009, background): “One possibility is that respondents under these circumstances use their own common membership in the two social groups as a heuristic for estimating the extent of overlap—a kind of ‘false consensus’ based on self-projection (Krueger & Clement, 1994).”
The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment (2003, background): “…that one’s opponent would respond like oneself is perfectly rational as long as the information about oneself is considered in the same way as any other information about a randomly selected sample of size one (see e.g., Engelmann and Strobel, 1999; Sherman et al., 1984; Krueger and Clement, 1994).”
On the epistemic costs of implicit bias (2011, background): “In subsequent research in this tradition, Tajfel and others have demonstrated this effect in a wide range of domains (cf. Tajfel 1959; see also Ford and Stangor 1992; Krueger and Clement 1994; Macrae et al. 1993; Macrae et al. 1994; Stangor 2009; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Wilkes 1963).”
Perspective taking as egocentric anchoring and adjustment. (2004, methodology): “This model differs from a simpler model of egocentric projection ( Krueger & Clement, 1994 ) because of the effortful, deliberate, and serial adjustment process that moderates a more extreme egocentric perception.”
An analysis of the association between topic avoidance and dissatisfaction: comparing perceptual and interpersonal explanations (2002, background): “When there is limited ability to observe directly the other’s relevant behaviors, projection may be particularly salient (Hoch, 1987; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Sillars et al., 1984).”
The Rational Side of Egocentrism in Social Comparisons (2008, background): “Although both lines of work suggested that rational information processing strategies might contribute to the biases, other research revealed that they were not wholly explained by them ( Krueger & Clement (1994) in the case of the false consensus effect, Kruger & Burrus (2004), Windschitl et al. (”
The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given (2000, methodology): “Krueger and Clement (1994) …nd a false consensus e¤ect even in the presence of other information.”
Social categorization moderates social projection. (2002, background): “…Lauderdale, FL 33301, Box m or 219 l, r, , ; s project even when they are asked not to or when receive feedback on the accuracy of their predict (Krueger & Clement, 1994); they project regardless of t level of cognitive busyness (Krueger & Stanke, 2001) regardless of information they have about…”
Like a camera in the sky? Thinking about God increases public self-awareness and socially desirable responding (2012, background): “Furthermore, people have an egocentric bias when reasoning about other humans' beliefs (e.g., Krueger & Clement, 1994), and Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, and Cacioppo (2009) elegantly demonstrated that peoples' representations of God'smind are evenmore egocentrically biased than are their…”