Appendix for: Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is There a Hedging Problem?
By Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, Hans-Theo Normann, Alexander K. Koch. 2010
298 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Safety Research, Philosophy
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/79eccde3878759526d75c9d68dc5a6e142463d26
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In General Decision Sciences
- David G. Rand
- Simon Gächter
- E. Renner
- Olivier Armantier
- Nicolas Treich
- Ernst Fehr
- Armin Falk
- Urs Fischbacher
In Safety Research
- David G. Rand
- Simon Gächter
- E. Renner
- Olivier Armantier
- Nicolas Treich
- Ernst Fehr
- Armin Falk
- Urs Fischbacher
In Philosophy
Citations in the corpus
- The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “A solution is to add additional incentives, such that subjects are paid extra if their reported beliefs are correct (Blanco et al., 2010; Croson, 2000; Gächter and Renner, 2010; Prelec, 2004).”
- A penny for your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs (2014, unknown): “Blanco et al. (2010) list a set of precautions that the experimenter can take to avoid hedging.”
- Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games (2012, unknown): “For recent discussions of the costs and benefits of incentivizing belief elicitation, see Armantier and Treich (2010) and Blanco et al. (2010).”
- Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game (2012, unknown): “Blanco et al. (2010) investigate the potential of hedging and find no evidence for it unless the hedging opportunity is very salient.”
- Why are Economists so Different? Nature, Nurture and Gender Effects in a Simple Trust Game (2014, unknown): “The experiment is based on a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game or binary trust game following Blanco et al. (2010). The game tree is given in Figure 1.”
- Leaders as role models and ‘belief managers’ in social dilemmas (2018, background): “Also, because beliefs are of central importance for our research question, we decided to incentivize beliefs despite the possibility of some hedging with contributions ( Blanco et al., 2010 ).”
- Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging (2010, background): “Indeed, consistent with our experimental outcomes, Blanco et al. (2010) nd that, when faced with transparent and strong hedging opportunities, many subjects in their lab experiment distort both their beliefs and their actions.”
- Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race Among Truth Serums (2015, unknown): “This was done to prevent hedging and wealth effects (Starmer and Sugden 1991; Thaler and Johnson 1990; Blanco et al. 2010).”
- Good news and bad news are still news: experimental evidence on belief updating (2019, unknown): “(2014) and Buser et al. (2016) (see Barber and Odean (2001) for an earlier summary), women are not less confident about their performance than men on the quiz.”