Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

By John H. Kagel, K. Wolfe. 2001

160 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/575a0552314fecfdb55a605e2709885b62873650

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Citations in the corpus

Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect (2008, background): “For instance, various authors have conducted experiments using ultimatum games that involve an inactive dummy player (Güth and van Damme, 1998; Kagel and Wolfe, 2001; Bereby-Meyer and Niederle, 2005).”
Let's Get Personal: An International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences (2006, unknown): “…to distinguish these two types of models include Blount (1995), Bolton and Ockenfels (1998), Bolton et al. (2000), Bolton et al. (1998), Charness (2004), Charness and Ernan (2002), Charness and Rabin (2002), Cox (2004), Kagel and Wolfe (2001), Kritikos and Bolle (1999), and Offerman (2002).”
Fairness in bargaining (2005, result): “12 This result is not completely in line with Kagel and Wolfe (2001)who found no differences in the rejection rate as a function of the third party’s payoff.”
Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining (2003, background): “In contrast to them, we inform our responders about the average offer, what might be thought of as the social norm, rather than about one other offer; see Knez and Camerer (1995), Cason and Mui (1998), Duffy and Feltovich (1999) and Kagel and Wolfe (2001) .5 Knowledge of one other offer has”
On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations, Outside Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games (2004, background): “Kagel and Wolfe (2001) use a three-person ultimatum game in which a proposer makes an offer to two responders, one of which receives a positive consolation prize if the other responder rejects the offers.”
A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2011, background): “…been documented before that F&S fails to capture behavior in certain games (see, for example, Charness and Rabin, 2002, Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, Kagel and Wolfe, 2001), F&S still provides a relatively parsimonious explanation for behavior in a large class of experimental games (see, e.g., Fehr…”
Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers (2005, background): “Also see Kagel and Wolfe (2001) and Bereby-Meyer and Niederle (2004) for results from bargaining experiments where players do not appear to have any concerns for other players’ payoffs.”
Testing theories of fairness - Intentions matter (2008, background): “5 Kagel and Wolfe (2001) suggest yet another way for studying the role of intention.”
Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining (2005, result): “However, the 1/3 threshold is what one might expect based on: (i) the limited threeplayer ultimatum game results reported (Guth and van Damme, 1998; Kagel and Wolfe, 2001); (ii) models attempting to explain behavior in the ultimatum game and related experiments (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000); and (iii”
Does Pay Inequality Affect Worker Effort? Experimental Evidence (2006, unknown): “These include Güth and van Damme (1998) and Kagel and Wolfe (2001), both of whom study ultimatum games with an inactive third party.”
A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness (2007, background): “3 Konow (2001) elaborates an objective theory of m0 as a function of the agent’s relative actual effort levels (“accountability”), the efficient effort levels, the agents’ basic material needs, and the context. Konow (2000) extends (part of) this theory to allow for self-serving subjective distortio”
Other Regarding Preferences: A Selective Survey of Experimental Results (2012, background): “6) Kagel and Wolfe (2001): This illustrates one of the biggest problems in the literature on other-regarding behavior and preferences – who is the “other”?”