A theory of reciprocity
By Armin Falk, Urs Fischbacher. Games Econ. Behav., 2006
2,731 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This Paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, the theory explains why the same consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why in bilateral interactions outcomes tend to be ‘fair’ whereas in competitive markets even extremely unfair distributions may arise.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/32b2cac8a5ed52d2f35dbdc3a56115c2b63cd1c9
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In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Ernst Fehr
- Stefan T. Trautmann
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Herbert Gintis
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
- Ernesto Reuben
- Matthias Sutter
- Colin F. Camerer
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- Simon Gächter
- Gary Charness
- Matthias Sutter
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Armin Falk
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Urs Fischbacher
In Sociology and Political Science
- Ernst Fehr
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Simon Gächter
- Armin Falk
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Urs Fischbacher
- Matthias Sutter
Citations in the corpus
- Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations (2007, methodology): “(1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) – shows how and why the social structure generates”
- To Pay or Not to Pay: Competing Theories to Explain Individuals’ Willingness to Pay for Public Environmental Goods (2011, background): “…explained by theoretical approaches focusing, among other things, on fairness, inequity aversion, and reciprocity (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Tutic & Liebe, 2009) and on different types of actors including “conditional cooperators” (Ostrom,…”
- Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) develop models that explicitly incorporate first and”
- A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons (2011, neutral): “DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.013”
- Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups (2007, background): “For example, in Falk and Fischbacher (2006) kindness depends on relative income positions.”
- Decomposing trust and trustworthiness (2006, background): “Fixed distributional preferences are compatible with inequity aversion, see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).”
- From dual processes to multiple selves: Implications for economic behavior (2014, background): “So far, formal models in economics have integrated non-selfish motives into the utility functions as additional components on equal footing with the selfish motive (see Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Falk and Fischbacher 2006).”
- Unmixed signals: How reputation and status affect alliance formation (2014, background): “An enormous literature on impressions of persons has consistently demonstrated that people overemphasize negative data in impression formation (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Peeters and Czapinski, 1990; Rozin and Royzman, 2001).”
- Factors Affecting Bloggers' Knowledge Sharing: An Investigation Across Gender (2011, background): “…for women bloggers than for men bloggers. knowledge Sharing and Reciprocity in Blogs Falk and Fischbacher identify reciprocity as “a behavioral response to perceived kind-ness and unkindness, where kindness comprises both distributional fairness as well as fairness intentions” [38, p. 294].”