On the Nature of Fair Behavior
By Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher. 2000
848 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/60adb2a58f33962e88ed184f4918b507030d1931
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Ernst Fehr
- Armin Falk
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Gary Charness
- Matthias Sutter
- Urs Fischbacher
- Michael Kosfeld
- Christian Zehnder
In General Decision Sciences
- Ernst Fehr
- Gary Charness
- Matthias Sutter
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Armin Falk
- John H. Kagel
- Urs Fischbacher
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- Matthias Sutter
- Gary Charness
- Klaus M. Schmidt
- Armin Falk
- Urs Fischbacher
- John A. List
- Martin G. Kocher
Citations in the corpus
- A theory of reciprocity (2006, background): “The difference be the best-shot and the ultimatum game can be explained in terms of intentions, ho We show this with the help of two stylized games, a reduced ultimatum and a re best-shot game (Falk et al., 2003).”
- A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness (2007, methodology): “Figure 6 illustrates the game trees employed by Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003).”
- Lab Labor: What can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? (2010, neutral): “Falk and Fehr (2003) provide the concrete example of testing tournament theory (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981), where contestants should in equilibrium choose effort levels to equate marginal effort with marginal gain.”
- Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights (2008, methodology): “order to show the existence of inequity averse individuals simpler experiments such as those in Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk et al. (2003), Engelmann and Strobl (2004), or Fehr et al (2006) are needed.”
- Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining (2003, neutral): “affects the responder’s fairness perceptions (Falk et al. 2003).”
- Monkeys reject unequal pay (2003, background): “People judge fairness based both on the distribution of gains and on the possible alternatives to a given outcom”
- Hurting hurts more than helping helps (2002, background): “Falk et al. (1999) show that in the ultimatum game the rejection rates of identical o$ers depend on the foregone opportunities.”
- Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games (2003, background): “A similar conclusion about the inadequacy of outcome-based models is reached by Falk et al. (2003) .”