Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments

By Dirk Engelmann, Martin Strobel. 2002

1,297 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f740d5d4ad51cbe3290edef242e248d4dded6511

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Citations in the corpus

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion (2009, neutral): “While there is little cheating on collusive agreements in the RChat treatment, there is not enough contingent behavior in Period 2 to make compliance with collusive agreements incentive compatible.(26)”
Are People Inequality-Averse, or Just Risk-Averse? (2001, positive): “…is also recent experimental research suggesting that people may have preferences for overall efficiency as well, in addition to their own payoffs and the degree of payoff inequality among subjects (Bolton and Ockenfels 2002; Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2005; Guth et al. 2002).”
A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility (2005, background): “There are games, however, where these differences lead to distinct predictions (see Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2003; Falk et al., 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 1998 and forthcoming).”
Responsibility for what? Fairness and individual responsibility (2010, background): “…Henrich et al., 2004), and a related literature discussing how education affects a person’s view of the trade-off between equality and efficiency (Engelmann and Strobel, 2006; Fehr et al., 2006).2 These studies do not, however, discuss in detail how such institutions might affect what people…”
Inequity aversion improves cooperation in intertemporal social dilemmas (2018, background): “‡For alternative theories of the other-regarding preferences that may underlie human cooperative behavior in economic games, see [34, 35].”
Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers (2005, result): “Third, our voting regressions suggest essentially no concern for the zero payoffs offered to non-coalition players in the BF game, in apparent contradiction to more recent results suggesting that agents have maximin preferences, meaning that they care about the payoff of the least well off player (e”
Attitudes to Income Inequality: Experimental and Survey Evidence (2014, background): “Fehr and Schmidt (1999) incorporate inequality into the individual utility function via the inclusion of all of the pairs of the differences between the individual’s own income and others’ incomes.”
The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons (2011, neutral): “…and Rey-Biel (2008) test whether people make different dictator choices when they know if they will be the dictator and when they don’t know before making their choices (making comparisons with the same games with role uncertainty in Charness and Grosskopf 2001 and in Engelmann and Strobel 2004).”