The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given
By Dirk Engelmann, Martin Strobel. 2000
122 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/605c6d9c66e17d322eb41e4cbb448b1b12703e6b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Urs Fischbacher
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- Simon Gächter
- Hans-Theo Normann
- Mariana Blanco
- Dirk Engelmann
- Simone Quercia
- Nisvan Erkal
In General Decision Sciences
- Simon Gächter
- Hans-Theo Normann
- Urs Fischbacher
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- Mariana Blanco
- Dirk Engelmann
- Simone Quercia
- Lata Gangadharan
In Safety Research
- Nikos Nikiforakis
- Simon Gächter
- Hans-Theo Normann
- Urs Fischbacher
- Ernst Fehr
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Dirk Engelmann
- Lata Gangadharan
Citations in the corpus
- A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2011, background): “…because such beliefs are in principle consistent with Bayesian updating 24 (see Dawes, 1989) “consensus effect” is a more appropriate term (see also Engelmann and Strobel, 2000, for evidence from incentivized experiments).16 Another correlation we find is between UG offers and UG responder…”
- Social Projection to Ingroups and Outgroups: A Review and Meta-Analysis (2005, unknown): “According to another view, people do not give egocentrically inflated weights to self-referent information (Engelmann & Strobel, 2000).”
- THE DECISION MAKER MATTERS: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GROUP BEHAVIOUR IN EXPERIMENTAL BEAUTY- (2005, unknown): “Engelmann and Strobel (2000) have shown that this false consensus effect vanishes if subjects are given appropriate monetary incentives and representative information.”
- Bargaining outside the lab - a newspaper experiment of a three person-ultimatum game (2005, unknown): “Our expectation data reveal a rather strong false consensus effect (Mullen et al., 1985; Engelmann and Strobel, 2000) in that subjects expect their own behavior to be more common in the larger population than it is estimated by subjects who engage in alternative behavior.”
- The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments (2012, background): “For a more general methodological discussion see Engelmann and Strobel (2000).”
- Appendix for: Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is There a Hedging Problem? (2010, unknown): “Hence we use the term “consensus effect” – following Engelmann and Strobel (2000).”
- Relative Earnings and Giving in a Real-Effort Experiment (2011, background): “Amongst the field studies which investigate the relation between income and giving, the most interesting one for our purposes is Auten et al. (2000).”
- A penny for your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs (2014, unknown): “Engelmann and Strobel (2000), using in-centivized belief elicitation, cannot reproduce the ‘false-consensus effect’ found in psychological studies that do not incentivize elicitation.”