The Effects of Disseminating Relative Performance Feedback in Tournament and Individual Performance Compensation Plans
By R. Hannan, Ranjani Krishnan, Andrew H. Newman. 2008
280 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e8327504ba8f89eb496717b7676b08008e80cdd1
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Michael D. Shields
- Joan Luft
- F. H. Zhou
- Clara Xiaoling Chen
- Richard J. Zeckhauser
- Michael G. Williamson
- I. Barankay
- Matthew Hall
In Management Science and Operations Research
In Safety Research
- Michael D. Shields
- Joan Luft
- Anh Tran
- F. H. Zhou
- M. Pagliero
- Clara Xiaoling Chen
- Christos Genakos
- Richard J. Zeckhauser
Citations in the corpus
- Interim Rank, Risk Taking, and Performance in Dynamic Tournaments (2012, background): “57 Hannan et al. (2008) provide evidence that feedback on relative performance decreases performance on average, while Eriksson et al. (2009) find that there is no significant effect.”
- Rank as an inherent incentive: Evidence from a field experiment ☆ (2012, background): “Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman (2008) find that feedback on relative performance weakens performance under a tournament incentive scheme, once feedback is sufficiently precise.”
- Tournaments Without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records (2011, unknown): “All errors remain our own.”
- Rank Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Workplace Experiment (2012, background): “Freeman and Gelber (2010), and Hannan et al (2008).”
- Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts (2011, unknown): “(Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Hannan et al. 2008).”
- Fifty-Year Overview of Judgment and Decision-Making Research in Accounting (2011, unknown): “Harvey et al. (1979) found that investors preferred financial statements that had less aggregated information.”
- Psychology Models of Management Accounting (2010, background): “Individuals can react to potentially disadvantageous social comparisons in a number of ways: not only by attempting to improve actual performance through higher effort (Frederickson, 1992) or new decision strategies (Hannan et al., 2008), but also by selecting and interpreting information — for exam”
- Reward System Design and Group Creativity: An Experimental Investigation (2012, background): “In doing so, we also contribute to research investigating the efficacy of tournament pay (e.g., see Young et al. 1993; Drake et al. 1999; Hannan et al. 2008).”