Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts

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Peer Choice in CEO Compensation (2012, unknown): “Approximately 20–30% of these firms use the same peer group for both compensation benchmarking and RPE (Black, Dikolli, and Hofmann, 2011; Gong, Li, and Shin, 2011).”
Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation (2012, unknown): “5 percent decrease in total direct compensation may understate the economic significance because: 1) it may represent a much higher percentage of change in managers’ bonuses, given that a large fraction of the total direct compensation is a relatively invariant base salary; and 2) as Gong et al. [20”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Many bonus plans use at least one relative performance metric, such as sales growth minus average sales growth of a group of industry peers (Gong, Li, and Shin, 2011).”
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016, methodology): “Gong et al. (2011), Bettis et al. (2014), and De Angelis and Grinstein (2016) describe the variation in the prevalence of such features in compensation contracts. By contrast, our interest does not lie in whether or not such conditions are present in the contracts, but in their quantitative importan”