Tournaments Without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records

By Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mareike Nossol. Management Sciences, 2011

321 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/48003eb73ad18352ca89ce01c128cb2873906b71

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Citations in the corpus

Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace (2013, unknown): “Likewise, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) and Azmat and Iriberri (2010) ﬁ nd that simply providing information to subjects about their relative performance boosts performance substantially.”
Top of the Class: The Importance of Ordinal Rank (2018, unknown): “…last-place aversion in laboratory experiments.4 These results are similar to findings from non-education settings where individuals may have rank concerns, such as in sports tournaments (Genakos & Pagliero, 2012) or in firms with relative performance accountability systems (i Vidal & Nossol, 2011).”
Social Incentives in Organizations (2018, background): “Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) use the second type of identification, that is they inform workers of their position in the distribution of performance and pay.”
Field experiments in labor economics (2010, background): “, 2008a,b), and in natural experiments (Bandiera et al., 2009a,b; Azmat and Iriberri, 2009; Blanes-i-Vidal and Nossol, 2009), evidence from field settings remains scarce.”
Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment (2013, background): “…the other hand, workers might prefer to form teams with friends because they enjoy the nonpecuniary benefits of doing so (Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan, 2003) or because friends are more able to co-operate in this context (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2005) thus limiting free-riding within teams.”
Getting Rid of Performance Ratings: Genius or Folly? A Debate (2016, background): “Although some research finds ratings improve motivation and performance (see Blanes i Vidal & Nossol, 2009), other research suggests they can hurt both motivation and performance, especially in collaborative work environments and when ratings are tied to differential rewards (see, e.g., Casas-Arce…”
Facing Your Opponents (2014, unknown): “For instance, Bohnet and Frey (1999a, 1999b) and Burnham (2003) find that visual identification increases cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games.”
Heterogeneous Peer Effects and Rank Concerns: Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Relative productivity has been found to affect behavior (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011), and research has shown that concerns for equity explain evidence from various laboratory experiments (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Recent experimental evidence demonstrated an aversion to having a low rank (Kuziemko”
Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment (2016, background): “According to Blau (1964), the reason that gifts are reciprocated is that people "are interested in maintaining a balance between inputs and outputs and staying out of debt in their social transactions" (p.”
Rank Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Workplace Experiment (2012, background): “The second study was by Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2010), which involves performance data about grocery packers at a warehouse.”