Limitations in the Use of Achievement Tests as Measures of Educators' Productivity

By D. Koretz. 2002

279 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Education, Information Systems and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91900d3f90b9943bf3cb19ad46be28a45a89ea50

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Citations in the corpus

Assessing Rothstein's critique of teacher value‐added models (2012, background): “3See, for example, Kane and Staiger (2002), Amrein-Beardsley (2008), Harris and Sass (2011), Martineau (2006), Koedel and Betts (2010b), and Koretz (2002).”
Different Tests, Different Answers (2011, background): “Others, however, assert that the many assumptions underlying these models make such claims tenuous at best (Koretz, 2002; Raudenbush, 2004; Rothstein, 2007; Rubin, Stuart, & Zanutto, 2004) and that low-stakes uses may be most appropriate.”
A Historical View of Subgroup Performance Differences on the SAT Reasoning Test (2006, unknown): “However, studies of the predictive validity of the SAT continually show that African American and Hispanic male students achieve somewhat lower freshman grades than their SAT scores predict, and African American and Hispanic females achieve on average about the grades that their test scores predict ”
Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China (2015, background): “…as opportunistic behavior or gaming, goal displacement, and organizational cheating, particularly when agents may have partial or complete control over the outcome intended by the principal (e.g., Barnow and Smith 2004; Bevan and Hood 2006; Bohte and Meier 2000; Heinrich 2004; 2007; Koretz 2002).”
The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in Chicago on Student Achievement in Promotional Gate Grades (2002, unknown): “For both of these reasons, critics have argued that the gains that are observed following the implementation of high-stakes accountability policies may not be permanent or generalizable to other measures of performance (Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey, & Stecher, 2000; Koretz, 1999; Koretz & Barron, 1998”
The Use and Usefulness of Performance Measures in the Public Sector (2003, background): “…is additional difficulty in trying to attribute such improvements to teachers: much of the variance in test scores is controlled by non-school factors, and learning is a cumulative process rather than one which can be attributed to the impact of one teacher at any one point in time (Koretz 2002).”
The Test Matters (2014, background): “…their differentiating potential, there have been numerous critiques of VAMs, including the assumptions underlying them, their measurement properties, and their stability over time (Hill, 2009; Koretz, 2008; McCaffrey, Sass, Lockwood, & Mihaly, 2009; Reardon & Raudenbush, 2009; Rothstein, 2009).”
Identifying Effective Teachers Using Performance on the Job. The Hamilton Project Policy Brief No. 2006-01. (2006, background): “…M A N C E O N T H E J O B THE HAMILTON PROJECT | THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 19 troubling evidence of teachers and principals cheating (Jacob and Levitt 2003), narrowing of the curriculum to tested subjects such as reading and math (Koretz 2002), and increasing instruction geared to particular tests.”
Autonomous motivation for teaching: How self-determined teaching may lead to self-determined learning. (2007, unknown): “One such policy involves what is often described as “high-stakes testing” (e.g., Koretz, 2002; Ryan & Sapp, 2005).”