Behavioral Responses of CEOs to Stock Ownership and Stock Option Pay

By W. G. Sanders. 2001

563 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/690015720114a6af8c41b8f6b28cd332f918696b

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Citations in the corpus

When much more of a difference makes a difference: Social comparison and tournaments in the CEO's top team (2015, methodology): “Following prior research (e.g., Sanders, 2001; Wright et al., 2005; Zajac and Westphal, 1996), (1) 197 firms were excluded from the final sample because complete demographics for CEO-TMT members or other data were unavailable for more than one quarter of the executives in each year (Jensen and…”
CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions (2007, background): “Second, as discussed by Sanders (2001), the risk-return characteristics of stock ownership and stock option ownership are fundamentally different.”
Pay Disparities Within Top Management Groups: Evidence of Harmful Effects on Performance of High-Technology Firms (2005, result): “The two-year lag is consistent with other studies that have examined the organizational consequences of executive pay arrangements (e.g., Sanders 2001).”
Assessing Managerial Power Theory (2015, background): “…the increased acceptance of such practices noted above, or, since preferences for and perceptions of risk may vary across individuals (Pablo, 1997; Sanders, 2001), it could Takeuchi / Expatriate Adjustment 185 have been the result of some executives preferring riskier arrangements or…”
The Effects of Top Management Team Pay and Firm Internationalization on MNC Performance (2004, background): “And while cash pay may appear to be less risky and therefore preferable, research on pay practices seems to indicate that it has been more common for powerful executives to amass large amounts of stock option pay (cf.Sanders, 2001b).”
CEO Hubris and Firm Risk Taking in China: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion (2010, background): “Firm risk taking has previously been examined in terms of performance feedback (Greve, 1998, 2003), slack (Bromiley, 1991; Singh, 1986), top management incentive systems (Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993; Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002; Sanders, 2001; Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 2007), and environmental f”
Storm Clouds and Silver Linings: Responding to Disruptive Innovations Through Cognitive Resilience (2010, unknown): “Empirical tests of prospect theory confirm the „certainty effect‟, wherein adverse behaviors (Casey, 1994; Kühberger, 1998; Mittal & Ross, 1998; Mukherji & Wright, 2002; Puto, 1989; Quails & Puto, 1987; Sanders, 2001; Wang, 2004; Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).”
CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT (2008, background): “Specific contextual characteristics play a significant role (Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Sanders, 2001).”
Can Directors Impact Performance? A case‐based test of three theories of corporate governance (2007, unknown): “…examining the relationship between corporate performance and various board attributes such as board independence (Bhagat and Black, 1999), leadership structure (Fosberg and Nelson, 1999), board size (Eisenberg et al., 1998), and the role of the CEO (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Sanders, 2001).”
What Have We Acquired and What Should We Acquire in Divestiture Research? A Review and Research Agenda (2006, background): “Sanders (2001) offered a differentiated perspective on the issue of effective internal governance structures by drawing attention to the fact that stock option pay and stock ownership may have different “option” properties and thus affect the risk-taking behavior of managers differently.”
Managerial Risk, Innovation, and Organizational Decline (2009, background): “Sanders (2001) empirically tested this view by exploring the differential impact of CEO stock ownership and options on 250 firms’ acquisition and divestiture activity.”
Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model (2007, result): “This prediction corresponds to arguments suggested by Shapira (1995), who proposes that executives tend to focus on the loss potential of an outcome distribution when considering alternative courses of action.”