CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions

By Rayna Brown, N. Sarma. 2007

324 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c7f4bc0667864c867eee7bc3210f4fe1bb13df5c

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Citations in the corpus

Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting (2011, background): “26In fact, Brown and Sarma (2007) document that CEO overconfidence and CEO compensation jointly affect the frequency of a firm’s corporate acquisitions.”
CEO Optimism and Incentive Compensation (2014, unknown): “Other related papers on the effects of managerial biases and personal characteristics on corporate decisions and outcomes include Brown and Sarma (2007) and Doukas and Petmezas (2007) on the impact on acquisitions, and Hribar and Yang (2013) on the impact on forecast behavior and earnings management”
Acquisitions and CEO Power: Evidence from French Networks (2009, background): “According to Brown and Sarma (2007), CEOs motivations are meaningful only if we consider CEO dominance, which reflects CEOs ability to convince stakeholders to follow the proposed direction or impose their point of view on them.”
CEO Narcissism and Accounting: A Picture of Profits (2014, background): “…yet distinct, relationship between CEO overconfidence and financial outcomes such as corporate investments, acquisitions, CEO selection, corporate governance, and innovation (Malmendier and Tate 2005; Brown and Sarma 2007; Goel and Thakor 2008; Malmendier and Tate 2008; Galasso and Simcoe 2011).”
Executive Personality, Capability Cues, and Risk Taking (2011, background): “personal characteristics—including locus of control (Miller and Toulouse, 1986), experience (Menkhoff, Schmidt, and Brozynski, 2006), and dominance (Brown and Sarma, 2007)—affect risk taking, CEOs’ personalities should shape their interpretations of any contextual indicators of their or their organi”
Discretionary Disclosure Strategies in Corporate Narratives: Incremental Information or Impression Management? (2008, unknown): “The takeover literature might provide more insights on the links between managerial characteristics and firm behavior [Jensen and Zajac, 2004]; [Brown and Sarma, 2006].”
The Right People in the Wrong Places: The Paradox of Entrepreneurial Entry and Successful Opportunity Realization (2015, background): “An important property of overconfidence is its continuous nature (e.g., Brown & Sarma, 2007; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weinstein, 1980), where individuals can be placed along a continuum according to the level of overconfidence they tend to exhibit on average.”
The Origin of Failure: A Multidisciplinary Appraisal of the Hubris Hypothesis and Proposed Research Agenda (2014, background): “Managerial self-importance is an indirect measure of holding substantial power—that is, “the potential ability of the CEO to impose his or her overconfident views on the decisions of the firm” (Brown & Sarma, 2007, p. 359).”