Structural Analysis of Manufacturer Pricing in the Presence of a Strategic Retailer

By K. Sudhir. 2001

352 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5a3a4d063e199a5e5378c8fc040bbd19be64d792

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Citations in the corpus

Retail-Price Drivers and Retailer Profits (2007, background): “Hence, we do not impose structural restrictions on the dynamic relations between variables (see Sims 1980, Sudhir 2001).”
A General Theory of Pass-Through in Channels with Category Management and Retail Competition (2005, result): “19 This result, and earlier ones, on the effect of retailer- and brandspecific cost-changes, are consistent with Sudhir’s (2001) results obtained in a single-stage logit model with outside good and no retail competition.”
Investigating Category Pricing Behavior at a Retail Chain (2002, methodology): “Recent empirical studies have attempted to incorporate the strategic behavior of both manufacturers and retailers in their analysis of channel interactions (see, e.g., Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim 2000; Sudhir 2001).”
Impacts of Power Structure on Supply Chains with Uncertain Demand (2013, background): “Sudhir (2001) empirically shows that a manufacturer Stackelberg game is a good ﬁt for some consumer product categories for which supply chains are dominated by manufacturers.”
Liberalizing A Distribution System: The European Car Market (2006, background): “See Sudhir (2001), Villas-Boas and Zhao (2001) and Berto Villas-Boas (2002).”
How Dynamic Consumer Response, Competitor Response, Company Support, and Company Inertia Shape Long-Term Marketing Effectiveness (2004, background): “aggregate retail level, and thus does not allow modeling of cross-store heterogeneity and strategic retailer behavior (Sudhir 2001).”
Multi-category competition and market power: a model of supermarket pricing (2017, background): “…there are concerns that prices are set inefficiently, either too high because of market power (see Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994), Nevo (2001), Sudhir (2001), Villas Boas (2007), Bonnet and Dubois (2010)), or too low because of a predatory intent or a negative consumption externality (see…”
Competition under manufacturer service and retail price (2011, neutral): “To find the suppliers’ reaction function, we need to find the first order condition which can be expressed as: 0 = ∂ΠMi ∂wi = Qi + (wi − ci) ∂Qi ∂pi ∂pi ∂wi ; where (39) ∂Qi ∂pi = −bp − θp (40) ∂pi ∂wi = 1 (41)”
Balancing Profitability and Customer Welfare in a Supermarket Chain (2003, methodology): “In many product markets, such as automobiles (Berry et al., 1995; Petrin, 2001; Sudhir, 2001a), researchers have readily-available measurable attributes to capture the underlying market segments in the category.”
Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance (2010, methodology): “A similar methodology has already been used for double marginalization scenarios considered below by Sudhir (2001) or Brenkers and Verboven (2006) or Berto Villas-Boas (2007) but none of the papers in this literature have addressed the particular case of competition in two part tariffs using the rec”
Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power? (2010, methodology): “This model has considerable empirical support in the literature (e.g., Sudhir 2001a,b; Besanko et al. 2003; Villas-Boas and Zhao 2005).4 Given that the manufacturer moves first, the game can be solved by backward induction solving first for the retailer price and then the manufacturer price.”
Does a Store Brand Always Hurt the Manufacturer of a Competing National Brand? (2015, methodology): “Sudhir (2001) and Che et al. (2007) use non-nested model tests to check whether MS or VN better describes the manufacturer – retailer interaction.”
Product‐Line Length as a Competitive Tool (2005, background): “The price elasticities implied by the estimated coefficients vary in magnitude between −2.63 and −4.55, which is 8See Sudhir (2001a) for additional details on this identification strategy. in line with other empirical studies of the yogurt market (Kadiyali et al. 1999, VillasBoas 2001).”
Vertical relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data (2007, background): “…Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) evaluate the degree of manufacturer competition and the retailer and manufacturers interactions in the ketchup market in a certain city, and Sudhir (2001) studies competition among manufacturers under alternative assumptions of vertical interactions with one retailer.”
Own-Brand and Cross-Brand Retail Pass-Through (2005, methodology): “In contrast, a vertical Stackelberg equilibrium in wholesale and retail prices, whereby the manufacturers move first, generates an ownbrand pass-through rate between zero and one that is inversely related to a brand’s market share (Sudhir 2001).”