Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply

By Kerry Back, Jaime F. Zender. 2001

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2d21b123467650f9684aaae507f15d49c98be4f2

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In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions (2004, background): “This distinguishes our analysis from that of Back and Zender (2001), McAdams (2002), and Pavan and LiCalzi (2002), who study mechanisms that rely on commitments by the seller to vary supply according to some predefined rule.”
What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions (2000, unknown): “This factor may have been an important contributor to several of the ascoes we have discussed.”
Real Time Pricing and Electricity Markets (2009, background): “…evidence that rms learn over time towards pro t- 17There is also a series of papers on how "adjustable supply" in multi-unit ordinary auctions reduces buyers market power and thus can eliminate low-price equilibria, including Back and Zender (2001), LiCalzi and Pavan (2005), and McAdams (2006).”
Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information (2008, unknown): “2 Back and Zender (2001) and LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) show how the auction can be designed to limit those collusive equilibria.”
Modeling Electricity Auctions (2002, background): “are costless in a uniform auction because the low inframarginal bids used to support the equilibria are payoff-irrelevant, and never received by the bidder.(18)”
The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods (2010, background): “, see Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Kremer and Nyborg (2004), Back and Zender (2001), McAdams (2007), etc.”
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions (2002, unknown): “These two inequalities follow respectively from (3) and (4).”
Auctioning divisible goods (2002, background): “As in Back and Zender [2],15 the ability to submit (steep) bid sched ules in a divisible good auction provides the bidders with an important strategic advantage.”
Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions (2006, background): “For instance, Back and Zender (2001) and McAdams (2002b) study auctions in which the auctioneer (a non-strategic bidder) decides how much to supply after receiving the bids.”