The Economic Theory of Auctions

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Agent-Based Computational Economics: Growing Economies From the Bottom Up (2002, background): “Examples include the commodity trading pit of the Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Stock Exchange [50].”
How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions (2002, background): “But the Danish designers had in fact read Klemperer (2000a), and they took its arguments seriously.”
What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions (2000, unknown): “Sealed-bid auctions are generally more pro table if bidders are risk averse or budget constrained (Klemperer, 2000a). best strategy of a bidder who knows its own value is just to bid up to that value, and winners’ payments are determined by the bids of nonwinners.”
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences (2001, unknown): “One of us wrote shortly after the U.K. auction that other “European governments would be foolish not to copy the U.K. in auctioning the radiospectrum, but they would be equally foolish to blindly copy the U.K. design without attention to their local circumstances” (Klemperer, 2000c).”
Auctions: Theory and Practice (2004, unknown): “(These further readings are reprinted in Klemperer, 2000.)”