The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences
By Ken Binmore, Paul Klemperer. 2001
297 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d94d203a584bdad820b24d0f25f1d0c141c4245f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Matthias Sutter
- Martin G. Kocher
- Alvin E. Roth
- Peter M. DeMarzo
- Sabine Strauß
- Andrzej Skrzypacz
- Ilan Kremer
- Thomas W. Hazlett
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Matthias Sutter
- Martin G. Kocher
- Sabine Strauß
- Alvin E. Roth
- Thomas W. Hazlett
- Roberto E. Muñoz
- Andrzej Skrzypacz
- Peter M. DeMarzo
In Marketing
- Matthias Sutter
- Martin G. Kocher
- Sabine Strauß
- Alvin E. Roth
- Thomas W. Hazlett
- Roberto E. Muñoz
- Andrzej Skrzypacz
- Ilan Kremer
Citations in the corpus
- A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies (2009, background): “6 Support for this view is also supplied in Binmore and Klemperer (2002) and Klemperer (2002a).”
- The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods (2010, background): “, Milgrom (2000), Binmore and Klemperer (2002), and Klemperer (2004).”
- How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions (2002, unknown): “and Switzerland, at least, were explicit that revenue mattered even though efficiency was the main objective (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002; Wolfstetter, 2001).”
- Auction Design for Selling CO 2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2007, unknown): “It is wellunderstood that some information, if provided to the bidders during the auction, can (and probably will) be used by bidders to implement tacit collusive strategies (Avery 1998; Binmore and Klemperer 2002; Klemperer 2002; Fabra 2003; Dechenaux and Kovenock 2005; Abbink, Brandts et al. 2006)”
- A Symmetric Safety Valve (2010, background): “The academic literature and numerous notorious examples of failed auctions point to a credible and efficient reserve price as an important aspect of auction design (Binmore and Klemperer 2002; Ausubel and Cramton 2004; Burtraw and Palmer, 2006).”
- Individuals and Teams in UMTS-License Auctions (2007, methodology): “Overviews are provided in Abbink et al. (2005), Binmore and Klemperer (2002) as well as Börgers and Dustmann (2005).”
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002, background): “Binmore and Klemperer (2002) report that initially, the plan was to auction four licenses, and there were already four incumbent firms.”
- Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design (2004, methodology): “This enables a simple ranking of the securities and the use of 31 This is the so-called “Wallet Game”; see Bulow and Klemperer (2002).”