What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions

By Paul Klemperer. 2000

946 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

GEORGIA IRRIGATION REDUCTION AUCTION (2004, unknown): “al., 2003; Klemperer, 2002, and Rassenti et al., 2002).”
Assessing the Performance of Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study (2007, background): “These included, to name but a few, the distribution of information (private-value versus common-value auctions), auction format (sealed-bid versus open call), and payment format (first-price versus second-price) (Klemperer 1999, 2002, 2004; Milgrom 1989).”
Do Auctions Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market (2008, background): “Klemperer (2002) more generally points to the number of potential bidders as a determinant of auction design.”
Auction Procedures and Competition in Public Services: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France and London (2009, background): “However, as argued by Klemperer (2002), collusion between bidders should be a major concern for auction designers.”
Managing electricity procurement cost and risk by a local distribution company (2004, unknown): “…Multi-round Auction To remedy the potential shortcomings of the typical RFO process, the MU adopts an internet-based multi-round auction whose design follows the Anglo-Dutch auction that “often combines the best of both the [open-] and the sealed-bid worlds” (Klemperer, 2002, p. 182).”
Auction Design for Selling CO 2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2007, unknown): “One way to reduce the impact of collusion in multi-round auctions is to limit the information provided to bidders during the auction to the minimum information needed for participation in the auction (McAfee and McMillan 1996; Klemperer 2002).”
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences (2001, unknown): “…For similar reasons, some recent ascending-price telecoms auctions, notably the Swiss 3G auction, have been fiascos in which there were no more bidders than licences (Klemperer, 2002a, b).35 33Reserve prices should have played a larger role in the subsequent European 3G auctions (see Section 7.3).”
Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial (2003, background): “Repeated open, ascending and uniform-price auctions are generally more susceptible to collusion than a sealed-bid approach (see Klemperer 2000).”
Individuals and Teams in UMTS-License Auctions (2007, methodology): “Overviews are provided in Abbink et al. (2005), Binmore and Klemperer (2002) as well as Börgers and Dustmann (2005).”
The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods (2010, background): “, Milgrom (2000), Binmore and Klemperer (2002), and Klemperer (2004).”
Buyer beware: robustness analyses in economics and biology (2011, background): “Klemperer, an eminent auction theorist and real-world auction designer (he advised the UK government on their 3G auctions in 2000), makes a striking observation: for all the theoretical sophistication of the extensive and technical auction literature, it is of little use to practical auction design ”
The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match (2017, background): “In the context of auctions, Klemperer (2002) argued that “most of the extensive auction literature is of second-order importance for practical auction design,” and that “good auction design is mostly good elementary economics.”
Adapting auctions for the provision of ecosystem services at the landscape scale (2011, background): “It is well established that relatively minor details in the design of auctions and other market institutions can have a major impact on market performance (e.g. Klemperer, 2002).”