The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods

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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information (2008, methodology): “In these cases there is no relevant asymmetric information, no learning form prices, and the equilibrium is independent of the distribution of demand uncertainty (as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989)).”
Preventing Zombie Lending (2014, background): “In the context of providing liquidity via asset purchases, the papers of Ausubel and Cramton (2008) and Klemperer (2010) have proposed auction designs that aim to to prevent paying more than fundamental value for the assets.”
Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities (2019, unknown): “Indeed the original version of the Bank of England’s Product-Mix Auction had one-for-one substitution built into its design (see Klemperer, 2008, 2010).”