An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay

By Ronald C. Anderson, John M. Bizjak. 2000

303 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4a61630598a04bdb7ef6d20ced91162d4b2b927

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Citations in the corpus

Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Studies of the link between pay levels and the structure of the remuneration committee, especially the presence of non-independent directors, tend to nd no e¤ect (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton, 1998; Newman and Mozes, 1999; Vafeas, 2003; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Conyon, 2006, 2014).”
Corporate governance structure and board of directors remuneration policies: evidence from Spain (2008, background): “…studies do not corroborate the existence of a relationship between the level of independence of this type of committee and payments to directors (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003), or, to put it more generally, between the level of directorial entrenchment and the probability that the company will…”
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Simultaneous Equation Approach (2015, background): “However, past studies are concentrated in the UK and US, presenting comparatively similar institutional contexts (Ang et al., 2002; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Chen et al., 2006; Cunat and Guadalupe, 2009; Sun et al., 2009).”
The Effect of Compensation Committee Quality on the Association between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Performance (2009, methodology): “Unlike extant studies that focus on compensation committee independence (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Newman and Mozes, 1999; Vafeas, 2003a), we use compensation committee characteristics other than committee independence to examine the effect of compensation committee quality on the…”
Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups (2010, background): “Focusing on the role of compensation committees, O’Reilly et al. (1988), Main et al. (1995), and Newman and Mozes (1999) suggest the existence of the inﬂuence, while Anderson and Bizjak (2003) suggest the opposite.”
Female directors, board committees and firm performance (2018, unknown): “In contrast, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) find that compensation committee independence and the presence of CEO on the compensation committee does not affect executive compensation, while committee independence does affect the timing of earnings announcement (Michaely, Rubin, and Vedrashko, 2014).”
Ceo gender and firm performance (2013, methodology): “…the firm, and this proxy is used by many, including Elston and Goldberg (2003) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003); LN (Assets) that is the natural logarithm of the total assets as reported by the firm, and this proxy is used by many including Anderson and Bizjak (2003) and Grinstein and Hribar (2004).”
Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive Stock Options (2009, unknown): “However, inconsistent with this view, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) find little evidence that lack of independence on the compensation committee affects executive pay.”
Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance (2009, background): “, Anderson and Bizjak’s (2003) sample period goes to 1998).”