Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive Stock Options

By Daniel W. Collins, Guojin Gong, Haidan Li. 2009

163 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/86fcd7dde896ca20e9f7db36dc0d3ec8c67fcb45

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Yonca Ertimur
2. F. Ferri
3. David A. Maber
4. Gennaro Bernile
5. David Hurtt
6. J. MacGregor
7. Alan I. Blankley
8. G. Jarrell

In Strategy and Management

1. Yonca Ertimur
2. Gennaro Bernile
3. David A. Maber
4. F. Ferri
5. G. Jarrell

Citations in the corpus

• Abnormal Audit Fees and Restatements (2012, background): “2004; Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Griffin 2003), the effect on executive turnover or reputation (Leone and Liu 2010; Feldmann et al. 2009; Collins et al. 2009; Cheng and Farber 2008; Hennes et al. 2008; Desai et al. 2006), the likelihood of future litigation (Palmrose and Scholz 2004), or other effects”
• The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal on Shareholders (2009, background): “Contemporaneous studies show that the incidence of backdating is inversely related to the quality of firms’ governance systems (Bebchuck et al., 2006a,b; Bizjak et al., 2006; Collins et al., 2007).”
• Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, methodology): “, 2009), when option-based pay for directors is higher (Byard and Li, 2005; Minnick and Zhao, 2009), and when directors and CEOs receive options around the same time (Bizjak et al., 2009; Collins et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2010).”