Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups

By Michael W. Faulkender, Jun Yang. 2010

420 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e7c404a348be803ffb82d9065e0e8e0ff2750267

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Citations in the corpus

Industry Tournament Incentives (2018, positive): “Selecting peer groups to form performance percentile benchmarks for CEO pay is a common practice and, moreover, peer groups tend to be comprised of firms of similar size from the same industry (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2008), Faulkender and Yang (2010), and Bizjak, Lemmon and Nguyen (2011)).”
Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation (2008, neutral): “statements, and Faulkender and Yang (2007) examine the choice of peer”
Peer Choice in CEO Compensation (2012, positive): “This is consistent with the findings in Faulkender and Yang (2012). However, once we decompose the peer pay effect into the talent and self-serving components in Columns (4) to (6), we find no evidence that the effect of the self-serving components of PPE increased over time using the FY model in Pa”
Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, positive): “Interestingly, we also find that firms did not appear to be troubled by including a long list of well-paid CEOs in their peer groups in 2009, contrary to the finding of Faulkender and Yang (2010), which only used the 2006 data.”
Tournament Incentives, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies (2012, background): “Such optionality can show up in peer group comparisons for compensation (e.g., Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen, 2008; and Faulkender and Yang, 2010).”
Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts (2011, positive): “Using disclosures about compensation benchmarking peers (newly available since the SEC’s new disclosure rules), Faulkender and Yang (2008) show that firms select highly paid peers to justify excess CEO”
Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain Controversial CEO Pay Practices (2014, background): “Although some find benchmarking consistent with competitive compensation (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen, 2008), others argue it is a way for CEOs to increase their compensation by benchmarking themselves to highly paid CEOs (e.g., Faulkender and Yang, 2010).”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, positive): “, of similar size and in the same industry), there is evidence that some rms are opportunistic and choose highly-paid peers (Faulkender and Yang, 2010; Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen, 2011).”