Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEOs in the Family-Controlled Firm: An Examination of the Level and Sensitivity of Pay to Performance

By Daniel L. Mcconaughy. 2000

299 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ac6d0fd81de808d9d0d57465d6a039f775251ed8

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Citations in the corpus

Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management, family control, and firm size (2011, background): “The empirical study of McConaughy (2000) finds that family CEOs indeed have superior incentives for maximizing firm value and, therefore, need fewer compensation-based incentives than nonfamily CEOs do, thus confirming the family incentive alignment hypothesis.”
How to Pay Nonfamily Managers in Large Family Firms: A Principal—Agent Model (2011, unknown): “McConaughy (2000) and Gomez-Meija et al. (2003) find that family CEOs receive less incentivebased pay than do nonfamily CEOs working at family firms.”
Founding Family Controlled Firms: Performance, Risk, and Value (2001, background): “Mishra and McConaughy (1999) examined why family controlled firms use less debt.”
Employee Training in SMEs: Effect of Size and Firm Type—Family and Nonfamily (2007, background): “In the smaller nonfamily firms 232 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT where concentration of ownership interest is relatively higher, limited capital and emphasis on operational efficiency (McConaughy 2000) restricts investment in human capital development.”
CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, unknown): “McConaughy (2000) and Block (2008) report evidence consistent with this hypothesis for the US and Germany, respectively.”
Influence of Family Involvement in Management and Ownership on Firm Performance: Evidence From Poland (2010, background): “First, the human and social capital of family managers can help in an emerging economy characterized by the weak enforcement of contracts, a lack of capital, and undeveloped product and labor institutional infrastructures (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; McConaughy, 2000; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Breton-Miller,”
Relational Competence-Based Knowledge Transfer Within Intrafamily Succession (2015, background): “Because of the fact that there is hardly any change in the person of the main decision maker for decades (McConaughy, 2000), a large amount of knowledge is generated over time without the necessity to distribute this knowledge within the firm.”
Enterprising Families Domain: Family-Influenced Ownership Groups in Pursuit of Transgenerational Wealth (2002, background): “The literature addresses the advantages to shareholders of being a private or closely held company (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; McConaughy, 2000); the agency relationship of ownership and management in public companies and long-run performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pollak, 1985); the agency effic”
Preserving Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms: Asset or Liability? The Moderating Role of Business Context (2013, background): “Therefore, because of this holdup problem, they will require a higher compensation to switch to and work for family-run firms, harming operational performance (McConaughy, 2000).”
The Adolescence of Family Firm Research (2012, unknown): “…where performancerelated compensation is used to induce self-monitoring by agents (Gómez-Mejía, LarrazaKintana, & Makri, 2003), family firms can be reluctant to reward executives with performancerelated incentives such as stock options for fear of diluting family control (McConaughy, 2000).”
Ability and Willingness as Sufficiency Conditions for Family‐Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory and Empirical Studies (2014, background): “…Wiklund, and Zahra 2005; Gómez-Mejía, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri 2003); family member as CEO and/or chairman of the board (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2003; McConaughy 2000; Voordeckers, Van Gils, and Van den Heuvel 2007; Westhead et al. 2001); presence of independent directors (Chen and Jaggi 2000);…”
CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms (2013, background): “Second, including firm performance in the family CEO’s compensation contract will give a sign of professional management and increases the firm’s attractiveness toward banks, lenders of federal sources, and perhaps individual investors or private equity funds (Chrisman et al., 2007; McConaughy, 2000”
CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective (2006, background): “McConaughy (2000) found the tenure length of family CEOs to be almost three times that of nonfamily CEOs (17.6 years vs. 6.4 years).”