How to Pay Nonfamily Managers in Large Family Firms: A Principal—Agent Model

By J. Block. 2011

120 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a0c8b4c13bd88c4f4e7a4bed7ab92bc88859a3d

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In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Organizational Characteristics on the Appointment of Nonfamily Managers in Private Family Firms (2015, background): “Nevertheless, the nonfamily managers are important stakeholders that may add knowledge, solve family succession problems, or even mediate family conflict (Block, 2011; Dyer, 1989; Klein, 2000; Sonfield & Lussier, 2009).”
CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms (2013, background): “Therefore, it is important for him or her to be able to leave the firm with a successful track record and thus with results of strong short-term performance (Block, 2011).”
Does Size Matter? The Moderating Effects of Firm Size on the Employment of Nonfamily Managers in Privately Held Family SMEs (2016, background): “Nonfamily managers may perceive active family owners as a factor restricting their potential for career advancement, and instead prefer employment with high-performing nonfamily firms (Block, 2011).”
Family Firm Heterogeneity: A Definition, Common Themes, Scholarly Progress, and Directions Forward (2021, background): “In all, only a few studies have focused on increasing the effort of nonfamily managers (e.g., Block, 2011; Chrisman et al., 2017), expanding the capability of family managers (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001), or bringing the two groups together to maximize the strengths of the family firm workforce.”
Nonfamily Managers, Family Firms, and the Winner's Curse: The Influence of Noneconomic Goals and Bounded Rationality (2014, background): “contribute to the firm (Block, 2011; Lee et al., 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).”
Risk aversion in family firms: what do we really know? (2012, background): “at the individual manager’s level and his or her compensation contract) (Bauguess and Stegemoller, 2008; Block, 2011).”