Managerialist and Human Capital Explanations for Key Executive Pay Premiums: A Contingency Perspective

By James G. Combs, Maura S. Skill. 2003

171 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7cfd5db6afbf09f5fa8a36fc2c56e860f4d1cb28

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate elite characteristics and firm's internationalization: CEO-level and TMT-level roles (2009, background): “Carpenter and Fredrickson 1998; Combs and Skill 2003 ; Kor 2006 ).”
The translation of corporate governance changes across national cultures: the case of Germany (2005, methodology): “This follows a procedure established by Coombs and Skill (2003) who matched firms in their study of executive pay by reference to their industrial affiliation and possession of assets with a value within 30% of the value of the sample firm's assets.”
Behavioral Agency Theory (2015, unknown): “In addition to the agency approach, theoretical frameworks include tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), human capital theory (Combs & Skills, 2003), the managerial-power hypothesis (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002), institutional theory (Balkin, 2008), political theories (e.g., Ungson & Steers,…”
A Tale of Two Assets: The Effects of Firm Reputation and Celebrity on Earnings Surprises and Investors' Reactions (2010, methodology): “T-tests comparing the full and reduced samples showed that the firms with earnings data available had significantly more total assets ($54.1 vs. $46.8 billion, p .05), greater sales ($18.7 vs. $15.11 billion, p .0001), and higher ROA (5.52 percent vs. 2.15 percent, p .001) than firms with missing ea”
Competence- and Integrity-Based Trust in Interorganizational Relationships: Which Matters More? (2018, background): “Others have shown that managers’ human capital, a form of competence, matters (e.g., Combs & Skill, 2003), as does managerial incompetence (Hendry, 2002).”
Stewards, Agents, and the Founder Discount: Executive Compensation in New Ventures (2006, background): “This power might reasonably be expected to translate into leverage over their companies' compensation processes and the ability to command higher compensation (Combs & Skill, 2003).”
Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance (2008, background): “In summary, this analysis suggests that organizations may suffer from managerial misbehavior and that several strong governance structures can hinder managers from extracting private benefits by implementing entrenchment strategies (Combs and Skill, 2003).”
Complementarity in Monitoring and Bonding: More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive Compensation (2009, background): “The first explanation deals with CEO human capital (Combs & Skill, 2003).”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “Arguing for a different perspective on TMT pay, Combs and Skill (2003) contrasted managerialist and human capital perspectives on executive pay premiums.”
Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, unknown): “stock of skills, knowledge, and social ties embodied in the capabilities to perform certain tasks that add economic value (Combs and Skill, 2003; Harris and Helfat, 1997; Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011).”
Firm, strategic group, and industry influences on performance (2007, background): “Our carefully selected sample was composed of 1,165 firms.”
Strategic Human Capital (2014, background): “This may be one reason we see very high executive compensation (Combs & Skill, 2003; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989).”
Human capital matters: Market valuation of firm investments in training and the role of complementary assets (2017, background): “Stockholder reactions to unexpected executive deaths yields gains of 2.4%, although a finer analysis suggests that the market response differentiates between successful executives and entrenched ones (Combs & Skill, 2003).”