Stewards, Agents, and the Founder Discount: Executive Compensation in New Ventures

By Noam Wasserman. 2006

391 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/035d0ba1b680a20edfdab5bc957f1bd8854cb19c

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Citations in the corpus

Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms (2008, background): “Alternatively, it may be that these insiders did not have a significant amount of ownership, and thus it was not a salient issue in regard to underpricing (Wasserman, 2006).”
Toward a Configurational Perspective on the CEO (2016, background): “Similarly, scholars document how CEO interests are highly variable and may not compete with shareholders (e.g., Makri, Lane, & Gomez-Mejia, 2006; Wasserman, 2006).”
Are family managers agents or stewards? An exploratory study in privately held family firms (2007, background): “Agency theory and stewardship theory are both concerned with the role of managers in achieving firm goals (Tosi et al., 2003; Wasserman, 2006).”
Economic and Technological Importance of Innovations in Large Family and Founder Firms (2013, background): “Moreover, founders have been shown to be willing to seek outside investment and reduce their control if such behavior enables their firm to grow and prosper (Wasserman, 2006).”
Family Control, Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms (2014, background): “This loss of control implies dilution of socioemotional wealth as the family is forced to share influence with outsiders (Wasserman 2006), and the character of the firm changes due to the implementation of greater bureaucracy to control the larger entity (Williamson 1967).”
Private Firms and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Economic and Management Perspective (2007, background): “For instance, Wasserman (2006) suggests that in new private ventures, the presence of organizational founder- vs. non-founder-executives provides an important context to determine whether agency and stewardship approaches to executive remuneration are more applicable.”
Family Business Succession and Its Impact on Financial Structure and Performance (2010, background): “However, Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) and Wasserman (2006) show that the influence of factors such as psychological ownership on the degree of stewardship behavior should be taken into account.”
CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms (2013, background): “Fourth, existing literature on executive pay in privately held family firms is scarce, because data has generally not been accessible (Ke et al., 1999; Wasserman, 2006).”
Paradigms and Theory Building in the Domain of Business Families (2009, background): “Agency theory therefore has driven the development of systems of external control with two complementary overarching purposes: to control agents and reduce agency costs (Wasserman, 2006).”
Promoting Stewardship Behavior in Organizations: A Leadership Model (2008, background): “Stewardship scholars theorize that stewardship behaviors are grounded in a sense of psychological ownership (Wasserman, 2006), which is a state of mind in which an individual feels psychologically tied to the target of ownership (i.”
How should we divide the pie? Equity distribution and its impact on entrepreneurial teams ☆ (2015, background): “” Likewise, some larger firms offer equity ownership to their managers as an incentive (Lerner and Wulf, 2007) because equity ownership is supposed to align the equity holder's interests with the interests of the firm (Wasserman, 2006).”
Are Family Firms Good Employers (2017, background): “Data from family-controlled Fortune 1000 corporations (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011), and a sample of 528 venture-capital backed private technology firms (Wasserman, 2006), lend general support to these conjectures.”