The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom
By M. Conyon, Kevin J. Murphy. 2000
623 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7b84701a7f56efba0eaa2dab3f695dff2244f277
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Marc van Essen
- Collins G. Ntim
- Michael Firth
- Nuno Fernandes
- Oliver M. Rui
- J. Otten
- Pursey PMAR Heugens
- Kofi A. Osei
In Strategy and Management
- Marc van Essen
- Paul M. Guest
- Collins G. Ntim
- Kofi A. Osei
- Peter L. Swan
- Rachel Merhebi
- Kerry Pattenden
- J. Otten
Citations in the corpus
- The Determinants of Board Size and Composition: Evidence from the UK (2008, background): “Therefore in the post-Cadbury period there is no longer a significant relation between profitability and board composition, suggesting that well performing CEOs have less influence to structure boards.”
- How Does Product Market Competition Shape Incentive Contracts (2005, background): “However, there is evidence showing that this trend might have been reversed in the 90’s (Conyon and Murphy, 2000).”
- Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation? An empirical investigation of UK companies (2007, methodology): “4 See, for example, Core et al. (1999). companies perform more of an advisory than a monitoring role.”
- An institution-based view of executive compensation: A multilevel meta-analytic test (2012, methodology): “The classical framework for analyzing the performance sensitivity of executive compensation is provided by optimal contracting theory (Conyon & Murphy, 2000).”
- Australian Chief Executive Officer Remuneration: Pay and Performance (2006, background): “5 Conyon and Murphy (2000) describe disclosure requirements of other countries, including the USA and UK.”
- Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Simultaneous Equation Approach (2015, background): “In theory, higher CEO pay reflects extra responsibilities associated with role duality and also increased influence of the CEO over the board and remuneration committee (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Sun et al., 2009; Conyon and He, 2011, 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013).”
- Financial incentives and the "performance of crowds" (2010, neutral): “one provocative analog is the observation that chief executives in Europe are paid considerably less than their American counterparts [26].”