How Does Product Market Competition Shape Incentive Contracts
By V. Cuñat, Maria Guadalupe. 2005
189 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e77e1f7c329a614bd9573306e5d1b52409285828
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In Accounting
- U. Peyer
- Vinay B. Nair
- K. Cremers
- M. Riggi
- Francesco Saverio Nucci
- Alex Edmans
- Fernando Penalva
- Amy K. Dittmar
In Economics and Econometrics
Citations in the corpus
- Takeover Defenses and Competition: The Role of Stakeholders (2008, background): “20 Cunat and Guadalupe (2005) find evidence that an increase in product market competition is accompanied by an increase in the pay-for-performance sensitivity using UK data.”
- Product Market Competition and Agency Costs (2007, unknown): “Several papers have looked at pieces of this puzzle, including both Cunat and Guadalupe (2003) and Santalό (2002) who find evidence of a link between competition 5.”
- Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition (2009, unknown): “A general result of virtually all competition models is that with more competition the residual demand that a firm faces becomes more elastic and shifts down.(10) This generates two counteracting effects in terms of incentives: On the one hand, more competition raises the reward to market stealing a”
- Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors (2009, unknown): “Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005, 2006) move away from deregulations and use a source of variation in competition based on international trade shocks to show that higher levels of competition increased the sensitivity of performance-related pay schemes in the UK and the US manufacturing sectors.”
- Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the EU Area (2011, unknown): “Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) and Baggs and De Bettignies (2007) both find that a higher level of product market competition increases the performance pay sensitivity of compensation schemes in U.”
- Product Market Competition, Returns to Skill and Wage Inequality (2005, unknown): “Cuñat and Guadalupe (2003a) and (2003b) shows that increased product market competition increases the sensitivity of pay to performance.”
- Performance pay and changes in U.S. labor market dynamics (2013, background): “Lemieux et al. (2009a), for example, document that the incidence of performance-pay jobs has risen considerably over the past decades and this has been associated with an increased responsiveness of pay to performance (see Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2005).”