Acquisition Returns, Increase in Firm Size, and Chief Executive Officer Compensation: The Moderating Role of Monitoring
By P. Wright, Mark Kroll, Detelin S. Elenkov. 2002
214 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/73de9f3b320f0a2079ee5f285d0695c62dcbda2c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Shaker A. Zahra
- Donald O. Neubaum
- M. Allen
- Jean-Yves Filbien
- Derek K. Oler
- S. Chikh
- Maria Goranova
- Ravi Dharwadkar
In Strategy and Management
- Donald O. Neubaum
- M. Allen
- Jean-Yves Filbien
- Derek K. Oler
- S. Chikh
- Maria Goranova
- Ravi Dharwadkar
- J. Harrison
Citations in the corpus
- Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “Examining the monitoring ability of boards, Wright, Kroll, and Elenkov (2002) showed that, whereas postacquisition firm size drives CEO compensation in firms with lax monitoring, acquisition performance drives CEO compensation in vigilantly monitored firms.”
- The danger of misinterpreting short-window event study findings in strategic management research: an empirical illustration using horizontal acquisitions (2008, background): “…transfers in 20 to 1 Pistre (2002) horizontal acquisitions Hayward (2002) Acquisitions 2 to 2 Seth et al. 2002) Cross-border acquisitions 10 to 10 Wright et al. (2002) Acquisitions 1 to 0, 3 to 3 Arthur (2003) Work–family initiatives 1 to 1 Coff and Lee (2003) Insider trading events 15 to…”
- Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Performance: The Moderating Effects of Investment Horizon, Activism, and Coordination (2006, background): “Most prior research has considered the volume or percentage of an institution’s ownership as a key indicator of its vigilance to monitor or influence executives’ attention to CSP (e.g., Graves & Waddock, 1994; Wright et al., 2002; Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996).”
- Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership (2008, background): “Therefore, the use of stock options in compensation packages should increase managerial exposure to the fluctuating fortunes of the acquiring firm’s stock price, and may have a positive impact on acquisition returns (Wright, Kroll, and Elenkov, 2002a).”
- Acquisitions and CEO Power: Evidence from French Networks (2009, background): “In addition, they are in search of increasing their compensation (Wright et al., 2002).”